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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction of this Petition for Review from 
the final Order of the Department of Commerce, Division of Real 
Estate pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(a), Utah Code Ann. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Whether the fact that Petitioner Orion Dale Quinlan 
(hereinafter, "Quinlan") was not allowed an opportunity to present 
evidence or argument to the decision-maker, i.e. the Real Estate 
Commission (hereinafter, "the Commission"), and the fact that the 
decision-maker did not review a transcript or record of the 
proceedings before the Administrative Law Judge constitutes a 
violation of Quinlan's right to due process of law, as guaranteed 
by Article I, Section 7, of the Constitution of Utah and Amendment 
XIV, Section 1, of the Constitution of the United States, rendering 
the agency action unconstitutional within the meaning of Section 
63-46b-16(4) (a) , Utah Code Ann. (Repl. Vol. 6D 1993) and 
constituting an unlawful procedure or decision making process 
within the meaning of Section 63-46b-16(4)(e), Utah Code Ann. 
(Repl. Vol. 6D 1993). 
The standard of review applicable to this question of law is 
a "correction-of-error" standard, with no deference given to the 
agency's decision or its procedure. Questar Pipeline Co. vs. Utah 
State Tax Commission, 817 P.2d 316, 318 (Ut. 1991). 
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2. Whether the fact that the Administrative Law. Judge 
recommended that Quinlanfs license be placed on probation, as 
opposed to suspended, and the fact that the Commission adopted both 
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law issued by the 
Administrative Law Judge, yet ordered that Quinlan's license be 
suspended, rather than placed on probation, renders the suspension 
of Quinlan's license arbitrary and capricious within the meaning of 
Section 63-46b-16(4) (h) (iv) , Utah Code Ann. (Repl. Vol. 6D 1993) 
and/or not supported by substantial evidence within the meaning of 
Section 63-46b-16(4)(g), Utah Code Ann. (Repl. Vol. 6D 1993). 
The standard of review applicable to this issue is whether 
substantial evidence does not support the decision of the 
Commission upon a review of the "whole record". Intermountain 
Healthcare, Inc. vs. Board of Review, 839 P. 2d 841, 844 (Utah App. 
1992) . The standard of review applicable to the claim that the 
agency action was arbitrary and capricious is that of 
reasonableness. Anderson vs. Public Service Commission of Utah, 
839 P.2d 822, 824 (Ut. 1992). 
3. Whether the Commission's Order, dated December 3, 1993, 
is void for the reason that the Commission had previously entered 
an Order, dated November 3, 1993, which was confirmed, adopted and 
issued by the Division of Real Estate (hereinafter, "the 
Division"), thus rendering the second Order the result of an 
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unlawful procedure or decision-making process within the meaning of 
Section 63-46b-16(4)(e), Utah Code Ann. (Repl. Vol, 6D 1993). 
The standard of review applicable to this question of law is 
that of "correction-of-error". Questar Pipeline Co. vs. Utah State 
Tax Commission, 817 P.2d 316, 318 (Ut. 1991). 
4. Whether the Commission's Order, dated November 3, 1993, 
fails to comply with the requirements of Section 63-46b-10(1)(c), 
Utah Code Ann. (Repl. Vol. 6D 1993) in that it does not include a 
statement of the reasons for the Commission's decision and 
therefore the Division has engaged in an unlawful procedure within 
the meaning of Section 63-46b-16(4)(e), Utah Code Ann. (Repl. Vol. 
6D 1993) . 
The standard of review applicable to this question of law is 
the "correction-of-error" standard. Questar Pipeline Co. vs. Utah 
State Tax Commission, 817 P.2d 316, 318 (Ut. 1991). 
5. Whether the agency decision is contrary to, and 
inconsistent with, its prior practice without a rational basis for 
that inconsistency within the meaning of Section 63-46b-16(h)(iii), 
Utah Code Ann. (Repl. Vol. 6D 1993). 
The standard of review applicable to this issue is 
"correction-of-error". Pickett vs. Utah Department of Commerce, 
858 P.2d 187, 191 (Ut. App. 1993). 
6. Whether the Commission's Order, dated December 3, 1993, 
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is based on a policy which was not adopted in accordance with the 
Administrative Rule Making Act, Section 63-46a-l, et. seq., Utah 
Code Ann. (Repl. Vol. 6D 1993) and therefore may not form a basis 
for the Commission's decision, rendering the decision-making 
process unlawful within the meaning of Section 63-46b-16(4) (e), 
Utah Code Ann. (Repl. Vol. 6D 1993). 
The Standard of Review applicable to this question of law is 
"correction-of-error". Questar Pipeline Co. vs. Utah State Tax 
Commission, 817 P.2d 316, 318 (Ut. 1991). 
7. Whether ex parte communication between the staff of the 
Division, acting in their prosecutorial capacity, and the 
Commission, acting as an adjudicative body, which caused the 
issuance of its Order dated December 3, 1993, constitutes a denial 
of Quinlan's right to due process as guaranteed by Article I, 
Section 7, of the Constitution of Utah and Amendment XIV, Section 
1, of the Constitution of the United States. 
The Standard of Review applicable to this question of law is 
a "correction-of-error" standard with no deference given to the 
Agency's decision or its procedure. Questar Pipeline Co. vs. Utah 
State Tax Commission, 817 P.2d 316, 318 (Ut. 1991). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
There are no statutes or constitutional provisions whose 
interpretation, alone, is determinative of the issues presented. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. 
Nature of Case and Course of Proceedings 
Quinlan was a real estate sales agent licensed by the State of 
Utah, Department of Commerce, Division of Real Estate, holding 
License No. SA 27188. (R. 4, f2 and R. 14, f2). 
Quinlan entered a plea of guilty before the United States 
District Court for the District of Utah, Central Division, to one 
charge of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1341. (R. 5, ^ [4; 
R. 14, 54; R. 19 J[3) . 
Subsequently, Quinlan completed an application for the renewal 
of his license. On that application Quinlan responded in the 
negative to the question, "[h]ave you been convicted of a criminal 
offense in the last two years?". (R. 5, J6 and R. 15, 56). 
On April 13, 1993, the Division filed a Petition with the 
Commission, through which it sought to revoke Quinlan1s license, 
alleging that he had violated the provisions of Sections 61-2-11(1) 
and (12), Utah Code Ann. (R. 6). 
The Division's Petition was heard before Administrative Law 
Judge J. Stephen Eklund on October 18, 1993. (Tr., P. 3). 
As set forth in his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Recommended Order (R. 19-26), the Administrative Law Judge 
recommended to the Commission that Quinlan1s license be placed on 
probation, fl. . . concurrent with the duration of his existing 
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probation as to his federal mail fraud conviction41. (R. 26). A 
copy of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended 
Order is attached as Addendum I. 
Quinlan was not provided an opportunity to present evidence or 
argument to the Commission. 
On November 3, 1993, the Commission issued its Order which 
served to suspend Quinlanfs license to practice as a real estate 
sales agent until his probation arising from the mail fraud 
conviction was completed and all restitution paid. (R. 27-28). 
That Order was confirmed, adopted and issued by the Director of the 
Division. (R. 28). A copy of that Order, dated November 3, 1993, 
is attached hereto as Addendum II. 
Thereafter, the Director of the Division sent correspondence 
to members of the Commission in which he proposed that " . . . more 
detail on the Commission's Order would be appropriate" and 
requested that a second Order be signed by Commission members. (R. 
209) . 
On December 3, 1993, the Commission issued a second Order 
which is more detailed than the original Order. (R. 211-218). A 
copy of the second Order is attached as Addendum III. 
A transcript of the hearing before the Administrative Law 
Judge was first prepared on January 4, 1994. (R. 195). 
A Petition for Agency Review was then filed with the 
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Department of Commerce (hereinafter, "the Department")". (R. 68-
72) . 
On March 25, 1994, the Executive Director of the Department 
issued her Order on Review Denying Oral Argument which serves to 
affirm the Commission's Order of December 3, 1993, in its entirety. 
(R. 266-271) . A copy of the Order on Review Denying Oral Argument 
is attached hereto as Addendum IV. 
B. 
Statement of Facts 
Quinlan does not dispute the Findings of Fact recommended by 
the Administrative Law Judge (R. 19-26), which were affirmed and 
adopted by the Commission (R. 27 and 29) and adopted by the 
Executive Director of the Department (R. 2 67). Quinlan wishes to 
direct this Court's attention to certain undisputed facts which are 
not inconsistent with, and which in fact support, those Findings of 
Fact. Those facts are as follows: 
1. For a period of thirty-eight years, beginning in 1952, 
Quinlan was employed, as a civilian employee, by the United States 
Air Force. (Tr. P.9, Lns. 1-5; R. 19 f1). 
2. While employed by the United States Air Force, Quinlan 
had total responsibility for the budgeting and disbursement of 
funds for the repair of all Air Force aircraft in Southeast Asia 
during the Vietnam conflict. (Tr. P.9, Lns. 10-15). 
3. Subsequently, for a period of one and one-half years, 
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Quinlan was responsible for the administration and disbursement of 
funds for the repair of the F-16 aircraft in Brussels, Belgium. 
(Tr. P.9, Lns. 16-25; Tr. P.10, Lns. 1-2). 
4. Quinlan had direct control of those funds administered by 
him for the United States Air Force. (Tr. P.10, Lns. 3-8). 
5. During the entire time Quinlan was employed by the United 
States Air Force there were no allegations that he had improperly 
authorized a disbursement of the funds he controlled, there was 
never any allegation that he improperly accounted for funds subject 
to his control, and regular audits of those funds never disclosed 
any misuse of funds. (Tr. P.10, Lns. 9-22). 
6. Quinlan was placed in charge of the Hill Air Force Base 
Museum fund-raising campaign. In that position he received cash 
donations. (Tr. P.11, Lns. 2-9; Lns. 13-18). 
7. At no time was there any allegation that Quinlan had 
misused or misapplied funds received by him for the Hill Air Force 
Base Museum. (Tr. P.11, Lns. 19-21). 
8. Quinlan supervised fund-raising for the "Roy Days" 
committee for the City of Roy. (Tr. P.11, Lns. 10-12). 
9. As fund-raiser for the "Roy Days" committee, Quinlan 
received direct donations in the form of cash and checks. (Tr. 
P.11, Lns. 22-25; Tr. P.12, Lns. 1-2). 
10. Quinlan's use and application of the funds received by 
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him on behalf of the "Roy Day's" committee was never questioned. 
(Tr. P.12, Lns. 3-5). 
11. For a period of ten to fifteen years, - Quinlan served as 
a Finance Clerk in the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints 
for four different bishoprics and two stakes1 presidencies. As 
Finance Clerk, Quinlan was responsible for receiving donations, 
maintaining accounting records and depositing those donations. 
(Tr. P.12, Lns. 6-16). 
12. As Finance Clerk for the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter 
Day Saints, Quinlan received donations in the form of both cash and 
checks. (Tr. P.12, Lns. 17-19). 
13. There were never any allegations that Quinlan had misused 
or improperly accounted for Church funds. (Tr. P.12, Lns. 20-25). 
14. Quinlan served as Branch President of the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter Day Saints mission in Bangkok, Thailand. (Tr. 
P.13, Lns. 3-4). 
15. Quinlan has served in four bishoprics and two high-
counsels for the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints. (Tr. 
P.13, Lns. 4-6). 
16. Quinlan is a member of the Sunset City Board of 
Adjustment. There has never been any question raised as to his 
ethical treatment of matters presented to the Board of Adjustment. 
(Tr. P.13, Lns. 14-21). 
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17. Quinlan served as Chairman of the Sunset City Planning 
Commission. Quinlan's ethics, in connection with his 
responsibility as Chairman of the Sunset City Planning Commission, 
were never questioned. (Tr. P. 13, Lns. 22-25; Tr. P. 14, Lns. 1-
12) . 
18. As a board member of the Clearfield Chamber of Commerce, 
Quinlan was placed in charge of the Clearfield 4th of July 
activities, including receiving funds collected in connection with 
those activities. (Tr. P.14, Lns. 13-25). 
19. Quinlanfs ethics and the manner in which he fulfilled his 
responsibilities as a board member of the Clearfield Chamber of 
Commerce have never been questioned. (Tr. P.15, Lns. 1-5). 
20. Quinlan served as Chairman of the Metro Police 
Consolidation Committee, a group which was charged with developing 
a plan to consolidate the police departments of five Davis County 
communities. (Tr. P.15, Lns. 6-19). 
21. Quinlan has served as a Scout Master, President of the 
Toast Masters Club of Hill Air Force Base, President of the Hill 
Air Force Base Administrative Club and President of the Society of 
Logistics. (Tr. P.15, Lns. 20-25; Tr. P.16, Lns. 1-12). 
22. In each of those positions, Quinlan was charged with the 
responsibility for the handling of organization funds. (Tr. P.16, 
Lns. 13-17). 
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23. No question was ever raised as to the manner in which 
Quinlan handled funds for those organizations and there was never 
any allegation that he had misused or misapplied funds entrusted to 
him. (Tr. P.16, Lns. 18-24). 
24. During the 1960fs, Quinlan was affiliated with Investment 
Realty and while so affiliated had responsibility for the receipt 
and disbursement of funds. (Tr. P.18, Lns. 9-16). 
25. No question has been raised or allegation made that 
Quinlan misused or misapplied funds received by Investment Realty. 
(Tr. P.18, Lns. 17-20). 
26. Quinlan has never been informed by the Utah State Real 
Estate Division that it had received any complaints concerning his 
handling of funds at Investment Realty or at any other time or that 
it had received any complaints whatsoever about his conduct as a 
real estate sales agent. (Tr. P.18, Lns. 21-25; Tr. P.19, Lns. 1-
8). 
27. Quinlan has never received any complaints from clients or 
professional colleagues about his conduct as a real estate agent. 
(Tr. P.19, Lns. 13-15). 
28. On July 9, 1992, Quinlan pled guilty to one count of mail 
fraud before the United States District Court for the District of 
Utah. Quinlan was placed on probation for five years and was 
ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $20,600.00 to 
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TransAmerica Insurance Company payable at the rate of a minimum of 
$350.00 per month. In addition, Quinlan was ordered to perform 
fifty hours of community service. (R. 19 1[3) . 
29. The crime for which Quinlan was convicted had no relation 
to his practice as a real estate sales agent. (Tr. P.20, Lns. 22-
25; Tr. P.21, Ln. 1; R. 21 J7). 
30. At the time of the hearing, on October 18, 1993, Mr. 
Quinlan unequivocally admitted his guilt and testified as follows: 
Q: (By Quinlan1s counsel) Mr. Quinlan, now I 
am going to ask you some questions that may be 
painful but ask that you be candid. Is it 
true that you entered a plea of guilty to mail 
fraud; is that correct? 
A: Thatfs correct. 
Q: Is it also true that a judgment of guilty 
was entered based on the plea? 
A: Thatfs correct. 
(Tr. P.20, Lns. 7-14) . 
Q: (By counsel for the Division) Mr. Quinlan, 
I must remark that you're resume is pretty 
impressive. You've devoted much of your life 
to service in various capacities, both in 
civic and religious matters as well as 
employment. But you did something pretty bad 
in 1992, didn't you? You were convicted of 
mail fraud. That involved filing a false 
police report that a peerless engine analyzer 
had been stolen, because Tunex didn't have a 
peerless engine analyzer, did it? 
A: No. 
Q: And you knew that? 
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A: Yes. 
(Tr. P.26, Lns. 3-14) . 
Q: (By counsel for the Division) Did you 
commit fraud? 
A: Yes. 
(Tr. P.37, Lns. 20-21). 
31. With regard to his feelings of guilt about his conviction 
and the conduct giving rise to that conviction, Quinlan testified 
as follows: 
Q: (By counsel for Quinlan) Mr. Quinlan, I 
would like you to tell Administrative Law 
Judge Eklund how you feel about that 
conviction. 
A: Well, it's the most difficult thing that 
I've had to live through. I have - it's the 
first thing that you think of every morning 
and the last thing every night. Devasting. 
My reputation is on the line. I'm well-known 
in the community as one that is above 
reproach. I have served long and well in not 
only Church but in every capacity and this has 
been very difficult for me. 
The greatest asset that I have that has helped 
me through this is a wife of 4 0 years who is 
very loving and very understanding. And also 
my family, 4 children and 11 grandchildren 
that have rallied around me and given me great 
support and (inaudible) but it is a very 
difficult experience. 
Q: I can tell that it's painful to talk about 
this. Would you like a short break, Mr. 
Quinlan? 
A: No. (Tr. P.21, Lns. 2-21). 
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32. Quinlan has complied with every requirement of his 
probation, including making timely monthly payments of restitution. 
R. 21 ^ 8). 
33. Should Quinlan violate any state, local or federal law, 
his probation would be revoked and he would be incarcerated. (Tr. 
P.23, Lns. 6-13). 
34. At the time Quinlan spoke with Cathy Howick of the State 
of Utah Insurance Department, during the month of April, 1993, 
Quinlan was then experiencing difficulty in personally accepting 
the fact that he had been convicted of a crime. (Tr. P. 53, Lns. 
24-25; Tr. P.54, Lns. 1-20). 
35. Quinlan surrendered, or did not contest the revocation 
of, his license to sell insurance issued by the State of Utah. 
(Tr. P.17, Lns. 8-19; Tr. P.54, Lns. 15-20). 
36. Quinlan was never notified by the Insurance Commission of 
the State of Utah that it had received any complaints about his 
conduct as an insurance agent other than those related to the 
criminal conviction which is the subject of this proceeding. (Tr. 
P.17, Lns. 19-23). 
37. As a real estate sales agent now associated with Better 
Homes and Gardens, Quinlan does not have access to client funds. 
(Tr. P.19, Lns. 16-25; Tr. P.20, Lns. 1-6). 
38. Quinlan is not qualified for any available employment 
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other than in the insurance or real estate field. (Tr. P.23, Lns. 
17-25; Tr. P.24, Lns. 1-4). 
39. On December 14, 1993, in response to a request pursuant 
to the Government Records Access and Management Act, counsel for 
the Division provided a copy of the first Order, dated November 3, 
1993, to counsel for Quinlan. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Procedural due process requires that Quinlan be afforded 
a hearing before the decision maker. Quinlan was not allowed to 
present argument to the decision maker, i.e. the Commission. The 
Commission did not review the evidence presented by Quinlan. 
Because Quinlan was denied due process, the Agency action is 
unconstitutional within the meaning of Section 63-46b-16(4)(a), 
Utah Code Ann. 
2. The Commission adopted the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law issued by the Administrative Law Judge. Its 
decision, i.e. to suspend Quinlan's license, is inconsistent with 
those Findings and Conclusions. Therefore, the Commission's Orders 
and the Order of the Executive Director are each arbitrary and 
capricious within the meaning of Section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv), atah 
Code Ann., and are not supported by substantial evidence within the 
meaning of Section 63-46b-16(4)(g), Utah Code Ann. 
3. The Commission's Order, dated December 3, 1993, is void 
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because the Commission had previously entered-, adopted and 
confirmed an Order addressing the same subject matter and arising 
from the same proceeding. The Order, dated December 3, 1993, 
cannot be a valid nunc pro tunc order and is, therefore, the result 
of an unlawful procedure within the meaning of Section 63-46b-
16(4)(e), Utah Code Ann. 
4. The Commission's Order, dated November 3, 1993, does not 
include a statement of the reasons for the Commission's decision 
and, therefore, fails to comply with Section 63-46b-10(l) (c) , Utah 
Code Ann., and constitutes an unlawful procedure within the meaning 
of Section 63-46b-16(4)(e), Utah Code Ann. 
5. The agency decision is inconsistent with its own prior 
decisions. The Agency has not provided a sound rational basis for 
that inconsistency. Therefore, the Agency decision must be set 
aside pursuant to Section 63-46b-16(h)(iii), Utah Code Ann. 
6. Both of the Commission's Orders are based on a "new 
policy" to the effect that applications for the renewal of real 
estate sales agent license will be denied so long as the applicant 
is on probation or has not completed the payment of restitution. 
This policy has not been adopted in accordance with the 
requirements of the Administrative Rule Making Act, Section 63-46a-
1, et. seq., Utah Code Ann., and, therefore, may not form a basis 
for the Commission's decision. Thus, the decision making process 
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is unlawful within the meaning of Section 63-46b-16(4) (e) , Utah 
Code Ann. 
1. The Director of the Division, acting in his prosecutorial 
capacity, communicated, ex parte, with the Commission, acting in 
its adjudicative capacity, concerning the contents of the 
Commission's final Order. That Communication caused a revision of 
the Commission's Order, dated November 3, 1993, and the issuance of 
a second Order, dated December 3, 1993. That ex parte 
communication constitutes a violation of due process, rendering the 
decision making process unconstitutional within the meaning of 
Section 63-46b-16(4)(a), Utah Code Ann., and unlawful within the 
meaning of Section 63-46b-16(4)(e), Utah Code Ann.f therefore, the 
Agency decision must be vacated. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Denial of Procedural Due Process 
Procedural due process, as guaranteed by Article I, Section 7, 
of the Constitution of Utah, and by Amendment XIV, Section 1, of 
the Constitution of the United States of America, applies to a 
proceeding in which a person's license to engage in a profession 
may be revoked. D.B. vs. Division of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing, 119 P.2d 1145, 1146 (Utah App. 1989). 
Procedural due process includes the fundamental right to a 
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hearing. As rioted in Wiscombe vs. Wiscombe, 744 P.2d 1024 (Utah 
App. 1987): 
One of the fundamental requisites of due 
process is the opportunity to be fully heard. 
(744 P.2d at 1025). 
By definition, the right to be "fully heard" includes the 
right to present argument to the decision-maker and to have the 
decision maker consider all of the evidence presented. 
In the present case, Quinlan was not afforded an opportunity 
to present argument to the decision-maker, i.e. the Commission, nor 
did the Commission consider all of the evidence presented by 
Quinlan. 
The Commissions Orders, dated November 3, 1993, and December 
3, 1993, are both purportedly based solely on the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law prepared by the Administrative Law Judge. 
Those Findings and Conclusions are narrowly drafted and exclude 
much of the evidence presented by Quinlan, as well as the argument 
presented by his counsel. 
In point of fact, a transcript of the proceedings before the 
Administrative Law Judge was not prepared until after the 
Commission's Order had been issued. 
Simply stated, because Quinlan was not allowed an opportunity 
to present argument to the Commission, and because the Commission 
did not consider all of the evidence presented by him, he has been 
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denied procedural due process. Therefore, the Division's first and 
second Orders and the Order of the Executive Director affirming 
those Orders must be set aside pursuant to Section 63-46b-16(4) (a) , 
Utah Code Ann. 
II. 
The Commission's Orders Are Arbitrary And Capricious 
And Not Supported By Substantial Evidence 
Both of the Commission's Orders and the Order on Review 
Denying Oral Argument, issued by the Director, are arbitrary and 
capricious within the meaning of Section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv), Utah 
Code Ann., and are not supported by substantial evidence within the 
meaning of Section 63-46b-16(4)(g), Utah Code Ann. 
Because Quinlan does not dispute the limited Findings of Fact 
recommended by the Administrative Law Judge and adopted by both the 
Commission and the Director, marshalling of the evidence is not 
necessary. It is the ultimate decisions based on those limited 
findings which are arbitrary and capricious, and are not supported 
by substantial evidence. 
The Commission's first Order, dated November 3, 1993, provides 
only the most cursory explanation of the reasons for the 
Commission's decision. However, the Commission's second Order 
provides greater detail. Read in its entirety, the Commission's 
second Order appears to be based, in large part, on its perception 
that "mitigating factors" are not present in this case. This 
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perception, apparently based upon the Commission's review of the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law is not supported by the 
evidence presented at the hearing and is not supported by the 
Findings of Fact. As mentioned above, the Commission could not 
have reviewed a transcript of the hearing. 
Admittedly, the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law do not 
detail the numerous mitigating factors established at the hearing. 
However, the Administrative Law Judge specifically stated that his 
analysis, and therefore his Recommended Order, were " . . . based 
on due consideration of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances 
." so that he might assess the extent to which Quinlan's 
conviction " . . . 'is adversely reflective of his ability to 
properly discharge duties performed by a licensee'". (R.23). 
The Administrative Law Judge specifically stated, " . . . the 
instant case presents many mitigating circumstances similar to the 
Hutchinson,, O'Brien and Goodman cases." (R.25) The Administrative 
Law Judge noted that Quinlan continues to diligently satisfy the 
terms of his probation, that his conviction did not arise from 
conduct relating to his practice as a real estate sales agent, that 
his status as a licensee did not facilitate the criminal conduct, 
that Quinlan has not engaged in any unprofessional conduct while 
acting as a real estate sales agent, that he has not been the 
subject of any complaints arising from his practice as a sales 
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agent, and that there is no substantial basis to conclude that 
Quinlan will likely engage in similar criminal misconduct in the 
future or that his ability to properly discharge the duties 
performed by a licensee have been measurably compromised by his 
conviction. (R.25). 
Having recited these few specific mitigating factors and the 
conclusions which he reached based on hearing the testimony and 
evidence, the Administrative Law Judge apparently felt it 
unnecessary to bolster his recommended Order with a catalog of all 
of the factors which should be considered in mitigation and which 
were established at the hearing. A recitation of those factors is 
set forth in the Statement of Facts, supra. 
In spite of the presence of substantial mitigating factors, in 
its second Order the Commission attempted to distinguish those 
cases cited by the Administrative Law Judge in his Conclusions of 
Law from the facts present in this case. In fact, the cases are 
not distinguishable, as discussed below. 
The Commission distinguished the mitigating factors ostensibly 
present in In re: Goodman, Case No. RE 92-03-19 (Oct. 14, 
1992)(attached hereto as Addendum V), because in Goodman, the 
applicant " . . . candidly acknowledged his prior indiscretions". 
In the present case, Quinlan repeatedly acknowledged that he had 
pled guilty to the charge of mail fraud, that a conviction was 
21 
entered based on that plea and that he had committed fraud. (Tr. 
20, Lns. 7-14; p. 26, Lns. 3-14; p. 37, Lns. 20-21). 
The Commission also noted that in Goodman the applicant 
recognized the "seriousness of his past misconduct". Quinlan not 
only recognized the seriousness of his crime, but testified as to 
the daily emotional toll taken by the guilt and anguish he 
experiences as a result of his criminal conduct. (Tr. P. 21, Lns. 
2-21). 
In Goodman, the Commission noted that the applicant stated 
that he would " . . . scrupulously avoid a recurrence of such 
inappropriate behavior". (Goodman, Conclusions, p. 4) In the 
present case, the Administrative Law Judge specifically found that 
" . . .[t]here is no substantial basis to conclude respondent will 
likely engage in similar criminal misconduct in the future or that 
his ability to properly discharge duties performed by a licensee 
has been measurably compromised by reason of his conviction." (R. 
25) . 
In Goodman, as noted by the Commission, the applicant provided 
information and cooperated with authorities. Quinlan entered a 
plea of guilty in the charge filed against him in the United States 
District Court and signed a stipulation resulting in the revocation 
of his license to practice as an insurance agent. (R. 20 and Tr. 
54, Lns. 15-20). 
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In Goodman, the applicant had completed his state probation 
and fully paid restitution, but was still on probation arising from 
his federal conviction and had not completed the payment of his 
fine arising from the federal charges. The Administrative Law 
Judge found that Quinlan had complied with all terms of his 
probation, although he had not then completed the payments required 
by his federal conviction. (R. 3, f8). 
In Goodman, the applicant's license was placed on probation 
concurrent with the duration of his existing probation. The 
evidence presented in this case is indistinguishable from the 
Findings of Fact recorded in Goodman, with the exception of the 
numerous, mitigating circumstances which are found in the present 
case. 
Similarly, in its second Order, the Commission attempted to 
distinguish the facts in In re: Hutchinson, Case No. RE 91-03-04 
(Nov. 20, 1991) (attached hereto as Addendum VI) from the facts 
present in this case. Incredibly, in its second Order, the 
Commission suggests that the criminal misconduct in Hutchinson was 
mitigated or excused by the suggestion that the crime may have been 
preceded by an excessive consumption of alcohol. Simply stated, 
abuse of drugs is not a mitigating factor and does not excuse 
criminal misconduct. 
Again, the facts presented to the Commission in Hutchinson are 
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indistinguishable, in any substantial aspect, from the facts 
presented by Quinlan to the Administrative Law Judge, with the 
exception of the numerous, additional mitigating factors present in 
this case. The sanctions imposed against Quinlan should not be 
more harsh than those imposed in Hutchinson. 
Similarly, in its second Order, the Commission attempted to 
distinguish its decision in the present case from its Order in In 
re: O'Brien, Case No. RE 90-11-2 3 (Jan. 17. 1992)(attached hereto 
as Addendum VII). In its Order, dated December 3, 1993, the 
Commission states " . . . no restitution was involved in Mr. 
O'Brien's case . . .". (R. 30). In O'Brien, the Administrative 
Law Judge specifically found that the respondent " . . . was also 
ordered to pay restitution, the amount of which was to be 
determined by the Adult Probation and Parole Division." (O'Brien, 
Findings of Fact, No. 5, p. 3) . 
The Commission also notes that O'Brien had satisfied his 
criminal probation to the extent that he was not required to report 
to Adult Probation and Parole at the time of the final Order. 
However, at the time of hearing, O'Brien had completed only 25 of 
100 hours of community service and had not completed his probation. 
The mere fact that the procedures utilized in the state and 
federal probation systems differ as to reporting requirements and 
that, in O'Brien, the Administrative Law Judge opined that because 
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the amount of restitution had not been established, it was possible 
that restitution would not be required, does not serve to 
distinguish the Order in O'Brien from the present case. In fact, 
in O'Brien, the Administrative Law Judge specifically noted that 
the respondent's crime was " . . . not entirely unrelated to [his] 
status as a licensee" and that he realized a " . . . substantial 
financial benefit . . . " from his criminal misconduct. (O'Brien, 
Findings of Fact, p. 5). 
For the foregoing reasons, both Orders of the Commission and 
the Order of the Director, affirming those Commission Orders, are 
each arbitrary and capricious and are not supported by substantial 
evidence. 
In addition, the Commission's Orders and the Order of the 
Director are arbitrary and capricious because they are internally 
inconsistent. 
In both Commission Orders and in the Director's Order, the 
Commission and the Director expressly adopt the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law prepared by the Administrative Law Judge. 
Those Conclusions specifically note the presence of "many 
mitigating circumstances", that Quinlan's ability to properly 
discharge his duties as a licensee has not been compromised and 
that placing Quinlan's license on probation, concurrent with his 
probation, will allow the Commission and the Division to monitor 
25 
Quinlan1s practice as a sales agent and will "adequately protect 
the public". (R. 25). 
The Administrative Law Judge concluded that even though 
Quinlan made a substantial misrepresentation during the license 
renewal process, that factor did not support enhancement of 
disciplinary sanctions. (R. 25). 
Because the Commission adopted those Findings and Conclusions, 
in full, its Orders are internally inconsistent and are therefore 
arbitrary and capricious and cannot be supported by substantial 
evidence. 
For this additional reason, the Orders of the Commission and 
the Executive Director's Order must be reversed and set aside. 
III. 
The Commission's Order, Dated December 3, 1993, Is Void 
The Commission first entered an Order on November 3, 1993, 
which was confirmed, adopted and issued by the Division of Real 
Estate. (R. 27-28). 
Without notice to Quinlan or his counsel, the Commission 
replaced that initial Order with a subsequent Order, dated December 
3, 1993. 
The only possible procedural device through which the second 
Order might be considered valid, is if it were a properly entered 
nunc pro tunc order. 
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As noted in Diehl Lumber Transportation, Inc. vs. Mickelson, 
802 P.2d 739 (Utah App. 1990), the function of a nunc pro tunc 
order is "not to make an order now for then, but to enter for then 
an order previously made". (802 P.2d at 742). The Court also 
stated that there are only two types of permissible nunc pro tunc 
order, i.e. (1) to correct a clerical error; or (2) to provide a 
remedy when a party dies after submission of a case but before 
judgment is entered. (802 P.2d at 742). Neither of these criteria 
are applicable to the present situation. Therefore, the Order 
dated December 3, 1993, is void. 
The initial Order was not set aside or vacated. Because the 
Commission had earlier entered an order based on the same 
adjudicative hearing, the second Order, dated December 3, 1993, is 
a nullity, and is therefore void as an unlawful procedure or 
decision-making process within the meaning of Section 63-46b-
16(4)(e), Utah Code Ann. 
IV. 
The Commission's Order Dated November 3, 1993, 
Must Be Set Aside 
The Commission's Order, dated November 3, 1993, fails to 
comply with the requirements of Section 63-46b-10(l)(c), Utah Code 
Ann., in that it does not include a detailed statement of the 
reasons for the Commission's decision. Therefore, the Division has 
engaged in an unlawful procedure within the meaning of Section 63-
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46b-16(40(e) , Utah Code Ann. For this reason, the Executive 
Director's Order, insofar as it may construed to affirm the Order 
of November 3, 1993, must similarly be set aside. 
V. 
The Commission's Orders And The Order Of The Executive 
Director Are Inconsistent With Prior Agency Decisions 
And, Therefore, Must Be Set Aside 
In Pickett vs. Utah Department of Commerce, 858 P.2d, 187 
(Utah App. 1993) , the Court held that Section 63-46b-16(4) (h) (iii) , 
Utah Code Ann., requires an agency to bear the burden of providing 
facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for a 
departure from previous standards for assessing penalties. 
The suspension of Quinlan's license is inconsistent with prior 
practice of both the Department and the Commission. In the 
interest of brevity, Quinlan will not repeat the discussion of 
inconsistent prior decisions by the Commission as set forth at page 
nos. 21-2 5, supra. In addition, in the Matter of the License of 
Jay Wilson, Case No. RE91-04-13 (February 25, 1993)(attached hereto 
as Addendum VIII), the Commission revoked Mr. Wilson's real estate 
sales agent license based upon conviction of a criminal offense, 
i.e. the entry of a guilty plea to mail fraud and conspiracy. 
However, that revocation was stayed on the condition that Mr. 
Wilson comply with restitution requirements and the terms of his 
criminal probation. The mitigating factors found in the present 
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case are not noted in Wilson. Clearly, as discussed in detail 
above, and as demonstrated by the great disparity between the 
sanctions applied in Wilson, and in the present case, the 
suspension of Quinlan's license is contrary to the agency's prior 
practice, and the agency has not justified the inconsistency. 
VI. 
The Commission's Orders Involve An Unlawful 
Decision-Making Process 
The Commission's Order, dated November 3, 1993, states, in 
part: 
The recommended Order is not adopted because 
it is inconsistent with the Utah Real Estate 
Commission's policy of not allowing licensure 
until an applicant has successfully completed 
probation and paid all restitution. (R. 27). 
The Commission's Order, dated December 3, 1993, states, in 
part: 
The Commission further notes that its recent 
policy with respect to initial applicants with 
criminal convictions has been to deny 
licensure until all restitution has been paid 
and until probation or parole has been 
successfully completed. The Commission 
concludes that it would fail to protect the 
public to allow an individual who is already 
licensed to retain his license and practice 
the profession when an applicant in similar 
circumstances would not be issued a license 
and allowed to practice. (R. 30). 
The Administrative Rule Making Act, Section 63-3 6a-l et. seq., 
Utah Code Ann.f requires that administrative agencies follow 
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certain procedures when adopting or implementing certain rules. 
Section 63-46a-3(2), Utah Code Ann., describes those 
circumstances under which an agency is required to adopt rules in 
accordance with the procedures specified in the Act. Subpart (2) 
of that Section states that, in addition to other rule making 
required by law, each agency shall make rules when agency action 
requires or prohibits an action and provides or prohibits a 
material benefit. 
Section 61-2-5.5(1)(a), Utah Code Ann., provides that the Real 
Estate Commission shall make rules for the administration of 
licensing of sales agents. 
Section 61-2-6, Utah Code Ann., enumerates the statutory 
licensing procedures and requirements for a real estate sales 
agent. That section makes no reference to any requirement that the 
payment of restitution be completed and terms of probation 
satisfied before a license may be granted or renewed. Therefore, 
the "policy" referred to in both of the Commission's Orders must be 
the subject of a rule. 
Rule 162-2-2, Utah Administrative Code, governs the licensing 
procedure utilized by the Division. That Rule makes no reference 
to any requirements concerning the payment of restitution or 
completion of probation in the case of applicants convicted of a 
crime. 
30 
The Commission has not complied with the requirements of the 
Administrative Rule Making Act in adopting the new "policy" 
discussed above. Thus, the "policy" may not form a basis for the 
agency decision in the present case. 
Therefore, the decision making process, which resulted in the 
suspension of Quinlanfs license, is unlawful within the meaning of 
Section 63-46b-16(4)(e), Utah Code Ann. The Commission's Orders 
and the decision of the Director affirming those Orders must be set 
aside. 
VII. 
Quinlan Was Denied Due Process Due To 
Wrongful Ex Parte Communication 
After the entry and adoption of the Commission Order, dated 
November 3, 1993, Stephen Stewart, as the Director of the Division 
of Real Estate, sent correspondence to Commission members 
requesting that a different, more detailed, order be adopted. (R. 
209) . 
The Division, acting in is prosecutorial capacity, sought the 
revocation of Quinlan's license. 
The apparently successful ex parte communication between the 
prosecuting authority and members of the adjudicative body served 
to deprive Quinlan of due process. The participation of an 
advocate in the process of deliberation mandates a reversal of the 
Commission's Orders and the Order of the Executive Director. 
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As noted by the Court in Stein vs. Mutuel Clerk's Guild of 
Massachusetts, Inc., 384 F.Supp. 444(D. Mass. 1974): 
While lay proceedings cannot be held to the 
due process standards required in a court of 
law, it offends notions of fundamental 
fairness to have the prosecutor present and 
taking an active part in the deliberations of 
any fact finding tribunal. . . . Anyone 
subject to such a practice could hardly be 
blamed for doubting that he had been treated 
fairly and impartially. (384 F.Supp. at 448-
49) . 
Similarly, in Stigall vs. Anchorage Municipality Police and 
Fire Retirement Board, 718 P.2d 943 (Alaska 1986), the Court held 
that an attorney cannot act as an advocate before an administrative 
agency and also participate in the agency's deliberations. (719 
P.2d at 945). 
Admittedly, the Division Director did not personally appear as 
counsel for the Division at the hearing before the Administrative 
Law Judge. However, it is the Division of which he is the Director 
which instituted this proceeding and which sought revocation of 
Quinlan's license. The Director's participation in the 
deliberation process, especially his communication with Commission 
members for the purpose of requesting the issuance of a second 
revised Order, violates due process. 
For this additional reason, the Orders of the Commission and 
the Director must be vacated and set aside. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Orders of the Commission, dated November 3, 1993, and 
December 3, 1993, and the Order on Review Denying Oral Argument 
issued by the Director of the Department should each be vacated for 
the following reasons: 
1. The agency decision is unlawful and unconstitutional in 
that Quinlan was denied due process of law because the Division 
Director improperly communicated with the Commission in its 
deliberative process and Quinlan was not afforded a full hearing 
before the Commission; 
2. The Commission's Orders are arbitrary and capricious and 
are not supported by substantial evidence because the agency 
decision is not consistent with the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law adopted by the Commission; 
3. The Commission's Order, dated December 3, 1993, is void 
because the Commission had previously entered and issued an Order 
dated November 3, 1993; 
4. The Commission's Order, dated November 3, 1993, does not 
include a statement of the reasons for the Commission's decision; 
5. The agency decision is contrary to, and inconsistent 
with, its prior practice, and the Commission has failed to provide 
a rational basis for that inconsistency; 
6. The agency decision is based on a policy not adopted in 
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accordance with the Administrative Rule Making Act. Therefore, 
that policy may not form a basis for the Commission's decision. 
Respectfully submitted this day of August, 1994. 
CROWTHER & REED 
>ed 
irdner 
for Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that on the ,3 day of August, 1994, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of Petitioner was hand 
delivered to: 
Lynn Nicholas 
Assistant Attorney General 
Consumer Rights Division 
Attorney for Respondent 
111 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0810 
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ADDENDUM I 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the License of : FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
Orion Dale Quinlan to Act as a OF LAW AND RECOMMENDED ORDER 
Real Estate Sales Agent : Case No. RE93-03-18 
Appearances: 
Robert E. Steed for the Division of Real Estate 
Larry G. Reed for Respondent 
By the Administrative Law Judge: 
Pursuant to notice duly served by certified mail, a hearing was conducted in the above-
entitled matter on October 18, 1993 before J. Steven Eklund, Administrative Law Judge for 
the Department of Commerce. Thereafter, evidence was offered and received. 
The Administrative Law Judge, being fully advised in the premises, now submits the 
following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order for review and 
action by the Utah Real Estate Commission and the Director of the Division of Real Estate: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Respondent is, and at all time relevant to this proceeding has been, licensed to 
practice as a sales agent in this state. Respondent was employed in various positions at Hill 
Air Force Base on a full-time basis for thirty-eight (38) years. He retired in September 1990. 
Respondent initially obtained his sales agent license approximately twenty-five (25) years ago 
and he owned Investment Realty from May 1965 until September 1971. 
2. Respondent has been previously affiliated with Referral Realty Inc., he became 
affiliated with Wardley Better Homes & Gardens in September 1992 and he presently 
specializes in transactions which involve low income families through the Utah State Housing 
Program. Respondent's principal broker is Mr. Steve Goff. This record does not reflect the 
extent of Respondent's prior experience in commercial and residential transactions or property 
management. 
3. On July 9. 1992. Respondent pled guilty to one count of mail fraud in United States 
District Couit proceedings. The Court suspended imposition of sentence relative to any 
prison term and placed Respondent on probation for five (5) years The Court further ordered 
Respondent: (1) be restricted to home confinement for 120 days, commencing July 27, 1992; 
(2) pay $20,600 in restitution to Transamerica Insurance Company via payments of at least 
$350 per month, commencing September 1992; (3) perform 50 hours of community service at 
the rate of 25 hours per year; and (4) immediately pay a $50 victim assessment fee. 
4. Respondent's conviction was prompted by unlawful conduct which occurred during 
1988 and 1989. Sparing detail, Respondent operated a Tunex franchise which subsequently 
encountered financial difficulties that prompted bankruptcy proceedings. He falsely 
represented to Zions Leasing Company that he had purchased a diagnostic engine analyzer for 
use in the Tunex business and Zions Leasing Company provided financing for that alleged 
purchase. Respondent filed a police report and insurance claim, whereby he falsely 
represented the theft of the analyzer on September 16, 1988. Transamerica Insurance 
Company made payment totalling $25,204 as a result of Respondent's false representation. A 
portion of the just-stated funds were paid to Respondent and the balance was paid to Zions 
Credit Corporation. In fact, Respondent had never purchased or owned the analyzer which he 
claimed had been stolen. 
5. Respondent's sales agent license was scheduled for renewal on or before September 
30, 1992. Respondent filed a renewal form with the Division on August 29, 1992. The form 
contained two inquiries: (1) whether any final judgment had been rendered against 
Respondent "as a result of any real estate transaction to which you were a party" during the 
past two years; and (2) whether Respondent had "been convicted of a criminal offense in the 
past two years". Respondent answered "no" in each instance. His answer to the second 
question was based on his belief the question only pertained to any conviction of a criminal 
offense related to a real estate transaction. 
6. Given the unambiguous language of the second question on the renewal form, the 
potential and foreseeable consequences of an affirmative answer to that question and the 
somewhat self-serving nature of Respondent's testimony in this proceeding, Respondent's 
belief as to the nature and scope of the question was not reasonable. Based on the foregoing 
findings, the Court further finds Respondent intentionally misrepresented the fact of his prior 
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criminal conviction when he completed the renewal form. Given the inferences which may 
be properly drawn from the evidence presented, the Division renewed Respondent's license in 
reliance on the truthfulness of his response to that question on the renewal form. 
7. There is no evidence Respondent has engaged in other fraudulent conduct. He was 
not acting as a real estate agent when he engaged in the conduct which led to his criminal 
conviction. There is also no evidence he has been involved in other criminal activity or he 
has acted in any unprofessional manner relative to conduct undertaken as a real estate sales 
agent since being licensed in that capacity. 
8. Respondent has complied with every requirement of his criminal probation to the 
present time. Specifically, he has made timely monthly payments toward the eventual 
satisfaction of the restitution to be paid. Respondent's principal broker is aware of 
Respondent's status as a convicted felon. Similar to other agents affiliated with Wardley 
Better Homes & Gardens, Respondent has no access to client funds in his practice as a sales 
agent. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Utah Code Ann., Section 61-2-11 provides the Commission, with the concurrence of 
the Division Director, may revoke, suspend, place on probation or deny reissuance of any 
license if the licensee, whether acting as an agent or on his own account, is found guilty of: 
(1) making any substantial misrepresentation; 
(12) conviction of a criminal offense involving moral turpitude. 
The Division asserts Respondent made a substantial misrepresentation as to the fact of his 
prior criminal conviction when he sought renewal of his sales agent license. The Division 
further asserts Respondent has been convicted of a criminal offense involving moral turpitude 
and thus urges his license should be revoked. 
Respondent concedes his conviction represents a crime involving moral turpitude. 
However, he contends Sections 61-2-11(1) and (12) are not applicable unless the substantial 
misrepresentation was made in a real estate transaction or the conviction of a criminal offense 
occurred relative to a real estate transaction. Given the nature of his conduct, Respondent 
thus asserts no basis exists to enter any disciplinary sanction as to his license. In the 
alternative, Respondent urges that probation-rather than suspension or revocation—is the only 
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appropriate action wan anted in this proceeding 
Statutes similar to Section 61-2-1 I have been enacted to protect the public from 
unscrupulous and dishonest real estate licensees and the purpose of such statutes is to guard 
against fraudulent real estate piactices See Pearl v Florida Board of Real Estate, Fla App , 
364 So 2d 189, 192 (1982) Those who deal with real estate sales agents have an 
unquestioned nght to expect such licensed individuals will consistently act with mtegnty and 
in a completely honest and ethical manner In re Goodman (Case #RE92-03-19, issued 
October 14, 1992). 
Significantly, Section 61-2-11 was amended in 1987. The previously-existing statute 
read as follows* 
The commission . . . may . . . suspend, revoke, place on probation, or deny 
reissuance of any license issued under this chapter at any time if the licensee has 
by false or fraudulent representation obtained a license, or if the licensee in 
performing or attempting to perform any of the acts specified in this chapter is 
found guilty of (Emphasis added ) 
When Section 61-2-11 was so amended, the just-quoted italicized language was deleted from 
that statute. Thus, Section 61-2-1 i no longer expressly authorizes the entry of a disciplinary 
sanction when a licensee has obtained a license based on a "false or fraudulent representation" 
submitted to the Division in a license application or renewal form. 
Given the broad language of Section 61-2-11(1), it appears the first phrase of the just-
quoted prefatory language in Section 61-2-11 was deleted as redundant The Court further 
notes Section 61-2b-29(l) and (3), which are companion statutes regulating the practice of 
real estate appraising These statutes distinctly and clearly provide for disciplinary action 
when a "material misrepresentation" is made "m an application filed with the division" or 
when any misrepresentation occurs relative to "an act or omission in the practice of real estate 
appraising " While Section 61-2-11 may not be a model of clarity, both the legislative history 
and the more reasonable construction of that statute compels the conclusion that Section 61-2-
11(1) applies m this proceeding and provides a proper basis to enter a disciplinary sanction as 
to Respondent's license 
Moreover, the deletion of the second phrase in the prefatory language of Section 61-2-
11 "significantly broaden[ed] the applicability of the statute", whereby entry of a disciplinary 
sanction would no longer be predicated on whether the underlying conduct was performed 
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with reference to acts undertaken as a licensee". In re McKee (Case #RE88-09-I2, issued 
June 16, 1989). That amendment to Section 61-2-11 clearly reflects the legislative intent that 
the scope of the statute be expanded to adequately protect the public interest. In re McKee, 
supra. 
The Court notes Respondent's urgence that Section 61-2-11(12) was again amended, 
effective May 3, 1993, and now provides that conviction of a criminal offense involving 
moral turpitude may prompt a disciplinary sanction "regardless of whether the crime was 
related to real estate". Based on the legislative history of Section 61-2-11 and the manner in 
which the Commission has applied that statute in prior disciplinary proceedings, the Court 
rejects Respondent's assertion that Sections 61-2-11(1) and (12) must relate to conduct 
undertaken in a real estate transaction. The 1993 amendment of Section 61-2-11(12) merely 
underscores the prior 1987 amendment of Section 61-2-11 and affirms the manner in which 
that statute has been applied subsequent to the 1987 amendment 
The remaining issue is the appropriate disciplinary sanction to be entered, based on due 
consideration of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances to thus assess the extent to 
which Respondent's conviction "is adversely reflective of his ability to properly discharge 
duties performed by a licensee". In re McKee, supra. Section 61-2-11(12) has prompted the 
entry of various disciplinary sanctions in other proceedings before the Commission. In re 
Pewitt (Case #RE86-06-33, issued January 14, 1987) involved a licensee employed by a bank 
as a foreclosure specialist, who was convicted of theft of funds payable to his employer which 
he had deposited, without authorization, in his own account That case contains the following 
language: 
Relative to the entry of a sanction in the instant case, it should be noted that 
Respondent's illegal conduct involved large amounts of monies and that said 
conduct was relatively lengthy in duration and of a highly serious nature. 
Concededly, Respondent was subject to criminal prosecution, ordered to pay 
restitution, and has financially suffered as a consequence. Respondent's 
reputation has also been damaged to a significant extent and it is duly recognized 
that loss of his licensure as a real estate sales agent will preclude his 
employment in that respect and may operate to restrict his ability to satisfy 
probationary terms and conditions relative to the previously-entered judgment 
Nevertheless, Respondent's present situation is one occasioned by his own 
actions. Absent evidence of some mitigating circumstances, an appropriately 
severe sanction should be entered. 
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Mr. Pewitt's license to practice as a sales agent was thus revoked. 
The license of another sales agent was also revoked, based on two convictions of wire 
fraud, relative to the licensee's participation in a real estate development project and the 
diversion of substantial amounts of monies from the construction loan relative to that project 
In re Gleason (Case #RE87-04-07, issued July 13, 1988). The license of a principal broker 
who had been convicted of rape and supplying alcoholic beverages to minors was suspended 
during the term of his criminal probation. In re McKee, supra. In that case, no discernible 
relationship existed between the conduct which prompted those convictions and the licensee's 
status as a sales agent However, the license was suspended until the licensee's release from 
criminal probation to thus "represent a measured evaluation of the need to protect the public 
and generally maintain the integrity of the real estate profession". In re McKee, supra. 
More recent cases have prompted the Commission to place licensees on probation. In 
re Hutchinson (Case #RE91-03-04, issued November 20, 1991) involved a licensee who had 
been convicted of making a corrupt offer to a bank officer. Mr. Hutchinson had served a 
four month term of incarceration in a community treatment center and he had been placed on 
criminal probation for three years. Another licensee was convicted of attempted forgery, a 
stay of enforcement had been entered on a twelve month county jail term and he was placed 
on criminal probation for eighteen months- In re O'Brien (Case #RE90-11-23, issued January 
17, 1992). Most recently, the license of a sales agent was placed on probation after that 
licensee had been twice convicted of securities fraud, placed on criminal probation for three 
(3) years on each occasion, ordered to pay fines totalling $7,500, required to pay restitution 
totalling $3,362 and complete 150 hours of community service. In re Goodman, supra. 
Respondent's prior criminal conduct is inexcusable and raises a substantial question as 
to his honesty and integrity. It further appears he obtained some financial gain, albeit 
indirect, as a consequence of his fraudulent misconduct. Significantly, none of the other 
disciplinary proceedings referenced herein included an aggravating circumstance present in the 
instant case. The Court duly notes Respondent failed to disclose the fact of his conviction 
when he sought the renewal of his license. While somewhat understandable, Respondent's 
lack of candor in that regard is nevertheless troublesome. Simply put, the Division must be 
able to rely on representations made by licensees as to their current status and qualifications 
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for any renewal of their licensure. Had Respondent accurately answered the second inquiry 
on the license renewal form, appropriate action could have been taken with regard to any 
renewal of his license at that time. 
However, the instant case presents many mitigating circumstances similar to the 
Hutchinson, O'Brien and Goodman cases. Significantly, Respondent continues to diligently 
satisfy existing probationary terms with respect to his conviction. Respondent's criminal 
conviction did not arise from conduct which he undertook while practicing as a real estate 
sales agent and his status as a licensee did not facilitate that criminal conduct Moreover, 
there is no evidence Respondent has engaged in any unprofessional conduct while acting in 
any capacity as a sales agent Further, he has not been the subject of any complaints relative 
to the manner in which he has provided services to others in his practice as a sales agent 
It is arguable whether a short term suspension of Respondent's license is warranted. 
However, no direct nexus exists between his criminal conduct and existing licensure through 
the Division. There is no substantial basis to conclude Respondent will likely engage in 
similar criminal misconduct in the future or that his ability to properly discharge duties 
performed by a licensee has been measurably compromised by reason of his conviction. 
Thus, the Court concludes the following Recommended Order will allow the 
Commission and the Division to appropriately monitor Respondent's practice as a sales agent 
as to adequately protect the public. Consistent with more recent cases decided by the 
Commission and the Division, Respondent's sales agent license would likely have been placed 
on probation approximately one year ago, had Respondent actually disclosed the fact of his 
conviction when he sought the renewal of his license. While the Court concludes 
Respondent's violation of Section 61-2-11(1) has been established by reason of the substantial 
misrepresentation he made during the renewal process, that factor does not support a further 
conclusion that the disciplinary sanction in this proceeding should thus be enhanced. The 
Court cautions Respondent that any failure to comply with the terms which govern his 
licensure or any subsequent misconduct which reflects a failure to act with complete honesty 
and integrity will likely prompt further proceedings and certainly jeopardize his ability to 
maintain any continued licensure as a sales agent in this state. 
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RECOMMENDED ORDER 
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Respondent's license to practice as a real estate 
sales agent shall be placed on probation, subject to the following terms and conditions: 
(1) Respondent's licensure to practice as a real estate sales agent shall 
remain on probation, concurrent with the duration of his existing 
probation as to his federal mail fraud conviction. 
(2) Respondent shall provide a written report to the Commission every six 
months from his probation officer as to whether he has maintained full 
compliance with the terms of his criminal probation. At such time 
that Respondent's criminal probation may be terminated, the 
Commission shall determine whether the probation as to Respondent's 
licensure as a sales agent should also be terminated. 
(3) Respondent's principal broker, and any principal broker with whom 
Respondent may subsequently become affiliated as a sales agent 
during such time his license is on probation, shall provide written 
reports to the Commission every six (6) months. The reports shall 
summarize the general nature of Respondent's practice as a sales agent 
and whether his performance in that capacity has been satisfactory. 
Respondent's principal broker shall disclose to the Commission any 
concerns as to Respondent's conduct as a sales agent 
Should Respondent fail to comply with the above-stated terms and conditions or otherwise 
violate any statute or rule which governs his license to practice as a sales agent, further 
proceedings shall be conducted and a determination made whether his license should be 
suspended or revoked. 
Dated this <ffi day of October 1993. 
rhinistrative Law Judge 
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ADDENDUM I I 
DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
STEVEN H. STEWART, DIRECTOR 
160 EAST 3 00 SOUTH 
P.O. BOX 45806 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84145-0806 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE REAL ESTATE COMMISSION 
In the Matter of the License ORDER 
Of ORION DALE QUINLAN to Act 
as a Real Estate Sales Agent CASE NO. RE93-03-18 
The foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are 
hereby confirmed and adopted. The Recommended Order is not adopted 
because it is inconsistent with the Utah Real Estate Commission's 
policy of not allowing licensure until an applicant has 
successfully completed probation and paid all restitution. The 
following Order, which shall become effective December 4, 1993/ is 
entered instead of the Recommended Order: 
IT IS ORDERED that Respondent's license to practice as a real 
estate sales agent is suspended until such time as his criminal 
probation is completed and all restitution paid. 
Dated this 5 day of November, 1993. 
UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION 
TOTOLBERT BE' 
/^N VftttfinQ-
DA*KC. SIMONS, J R ^ 
CLAUDIA E. ASHBY 
i The above Order is confirmed, Adopted and thus issued this 
'K>- day of Nw(Z^(*>(lil 1993. ^ — . „ 
STEVEN H. STEWART, DIRECTOR 
DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE 
93-03-18.0 
ADDENDUM III 
DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
STEVEN H. STEWART, DIRECTOR 
160 EAST 3 00 SOUTH 
P.O. BOX 45806 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84145-0806 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE REAL ESTATE COMMISSION 
In the Matter of the License ORDER 
of ORION DALE QUINLAN to Act 
as a Real Estate Sales Agent CASE NO. RE93-03-18 
The foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are 
hereby confirmed and adopted. The Utah Real Estate Commission (the 
Commission) does not adopt the Recommended Order because of the 
serious nature of Mr. Quinlan's conviction and the aggravating 
circumstance of his intentional misrepresentation concerning the 
conviction on his license renewal application. 
The Commission notes the absence in this case of some of the 
mitigating factors cited by the Court in In re Goodman (Case RE92-
03-19, issued October 14, 1992). Referring to Mr. Goodman, the 
Court stated at page 4 of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
and Recommended Order: "The Court is further impressed with the 
applicant's testimony and demeanor during the instant hearing, 
which reveals he candidly acknowledges his prior indiscretions, 
recognizes the seriousness of his past misconduct and states he 
will scrupulously avoid an recurrence of such inappropriate 
behavior." The Court found that Mr. Goodman provided information 
and fully cooperated with both state and federal authorities as to 
other securities matters under investigation. Mr. Goodman had also 
successfully completed his state probation and fully paid his 
restitution and fines from the state conviction at the time of the 
hearing although he was still on probation from the federal 
conviction and still making payments toward his fine in the federal 
case. 
The Commission distinguishes Mr. Quinlan's case from In re 
Hutchinson (Case RE91-03-04, issued November 20, 1991) because 
there was no evidence that Mr. Hutchinson benefited from his 
criminal conduct, whereas Mr. Quinlan obtained financial gain as a 
consequence of his criminal conduct. Another mitigating factor 
cited by the Court in In re Hutchinson which is lacking in this 
case was the possibility that Mr. Hutchinson's criminal conduct may 
have been preceded by an excessive consumption of alcohol. 
The Commission distinguishes Mr. Quinlan's case from In re 
O'Brien (Case RE90-11-23, issued January 17, 1992) in that no 
restitution was involved in Mr. O'Brien's case, and Mr. O'Brien had 
satisfied his criminal probation to the extent that he was no 
longer required to report to Adult Probation and Parole at the time 
of the final Order. 
The Commission further notes that its recent policy with 
respect to initial applicants with criminal convictions has been to 
deny licensure until all restitution has been paid and until 
probation or parole has been successfully completed. The 
Commission concludes that it would fail to protect the public to 
allow an individual who is already licensed to retain his license 
and practice the profession when an applicant in similar 
circumstances would not be issued a license and allowed to practice. 
The Commission concludes therefore that it is in the public 
interest to suspend Mr. Quinlan's license until such time as his 
criminal probation is successfully completed and all of his 
restitution has been paid. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Orion Dale Quinlan's Utah real 
estate license will be suspended beginning 30 days after the 
issuance of this Order, and will remain on suspension until he 
provides evidence to the Division of release from probation and 
payment of all restitution. 
DATED this day of , 1993. 
UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION 
f^i^ H TOLBERT 
DAN C. SIMONS, JR. 
CLAUDIA E. ASHBY 
ROBERT H. ZIEGLER 
R. CURT WEBB 
The undersigned concurs with the foregoing Order this 
day of , 1993. 
STEVEN H. STEWART, DIRECTOR 
DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE 
93-03-18.o 
* "' The Commission concludes therefore that it is in the public 
"
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 interest to suspend Mr. Quinlan's license until such time as his 
criminal probation is successfully completed and all of his 
restitution has been paid. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Orion Dale Quinlan's Utah real 
estate license will be suspended beginning 30 days after the 
issuance of this Order, and will remain on suspension until he 
provides evidence to the Division of release from probation and 
payment of all restitution. 
DATED this day of , 1993. 
UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION 
BETH TOLBERT 
m(Jvi^^)-
CLAUDIA-E. ASHBY 
ROBERT H. ZIEGLER 
R. CURT WEBB 
The undersigned concurs with the foregoing Order this 
day of , 1993. 
STEVEN H. STEWART, DIRECTOR 
DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE 
93-03-18.o 
The Commission concludes therefore that it is in the public 
interest to suspend Mr, Quinlan's license until such time as his 
criminal probation is successfully completed and all of his 
restitution has been paid. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Orion Dale Quinlan's Utah real 
estate license will be suspended beginning 30 days after the 
issuance of this Order, and will remain on suspension until he 
provides evidence to the Division of release from probation and 
payment of all restitution. 
DATED this day of , 1993. 
UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION 
BETH TOLBERT 
DAN C. SIMONS, JR. 
CLAUDIA E. A^HBY 
ROBERT H. ZIEGLER 
r 
R. CURT WEBB 
The undersigned concurs with the foregoing Order this 
day of , 1993. 
STEVEN H. STEWART, DIRECTOR 
DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE 
93-03-18.o 
The Commission concludes therefore that it is in the public 
interest to suspend Mr. Quinlan's license until such time as his 
criminal probation is successfully completed and all of his 
restitution has been paid. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Orion Dale Quinlan's Utah real 
estate license will be suspended beginning 30 days after the 
issuance of this Order, and will remain on suspension until he 
provides evidence to the Division of release from probation and 
payment of all restitution. 
DATED this day of , 1993. 
UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION 
BETH TOLBERT 
DAN C. SIMONS, JR. 
CLAUDIA E. ASHBY 
•<3La v-\ • 
ROBERT H. ZIEG 
R. CURT WEBB 
The undersigned concurs with the foregoing Order this 
day of , 1993. 
STEVEN H. STEWART, DIRECTOR 
DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE 
93-03-18.o 
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The Commission concludes therefore that it is in the public 
interest to suspend Mr. Quinlan's license until such time as his 
criminal probation is successfully completed and all of his 
restitution has been paid. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Orion Dale Quinlan's Utah real 
estate license will be suspended beginning 30 days after the 
issuance of this Order, and will remain on suspension until he 
provides evidence to the Division of release from probation and 
payment of all restitution. 
DATED this day of , 1993. 
UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION 
BETH TOLBERT 
DAN C. SIMONS, JR. 
CLAUDIA E. ASHBY 
ROBERT H. ZIEG^BR 
•"£. CURtf WEBB 
The undersigned concurs with the/foregoing Order this 
day of , 1993. ' 
STEVEN H. STEWART, DIRECTOR 
DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE 
93-03-18.o 
The Commission concludes therefore that it is in the public 
interest to suspend Mr. Qumlan's license until such time as his 
criminal probation is successfully completed and all of his 
restitution has been paid. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Orion Dale Quinlan's Utah real 
estate license will be suspended beginning 30 days after the 
issuance of this Order, and will remain on suspension until he 
provides evidence to the Division of release from probation and 
payment of all restitution. 
DATED this day of , 1993. 
UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION 
BETH TOLBERT 
DAN C. SIMONS, JR. 
CLAUDIA E. ASHBY 
ROBERT H. ZIEGLER 
R. CURT WEBB 
The undersigned concurs with the foregoing Order this > -— 
day of k x ^ z ^ S ^ , , 1993. 
STEVEN H. STEWART, DIRECTOR 
DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE 
93-03-18.o 
ADDENDUM I V 
BEFORE THE 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSE OF ORDER ON REVIEW 
ORION DALE QUINLAN TO ACT AS DENYING ORAL ARGUMENT 
A REAL ESTATE SALES AGENT Case No. RE93-03-18 
INTRODUCTION 
This matter comes before the Executive Director on the request for agency review 
submiiieu oy Orion Dale Quinlan (Petitioner). The Division of Real Estate (Division) suspended 
Petitioner's license to practice as a sales agent shortly following the renewal of that license in 
August of 1992. After various proceedings, as is more fully set forth below, Petitioner filed this 
request for agency review on January 14, 1994. The Division filed a responsive brief on February 
14, 1994. 
STATUTES OR RULES PERMITTING OR REQUIRING REVIEW 
Agency review of the Division's decision is conducted pursuant to Section 63-46b-12, 
Utah Code Annotated, and Rule Rl 51-46b-13 of the Utah Administrative Code. 
ISSUES REVIEWED 
1. Whether the Order was arbitrary and capricious or otherwise an abuse of 
discretion. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The findings of fact recommended by the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on October 29, 
1993, as adopted by the Commission, are not disputed by the parties. Therefore, the same 
findings of fact are adopted for purposes of this review A partial summary of these facts follows 
with additional findings adopted by the Executive Director* 
1. On July 9, 1992, Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to a charge of mail fraud in 
connection with a transaction unrelated to his conduct as a real estate licensee. During August of 
1992, Petitioner applied to the Division for renewal of his license, indicating on the renewal 
application that he had not been convicted of a criminal offense within the preceding two years. 
2. Following the renewal of Petitioner's license, the Division learned of Petitioner's 
conviction and the inaccuracy of his response on the renewal application. The Division 
commenced agency action against Petitioner's license on April 13, 1993. A hearing was 
conducted on October 18, 1993, following which the ALJ issued findings of fact, conclusions of 
law, and a recommended order. The ALJ recommended that Petitioner's license be placed on 
probation, concurrent with the probation imposed by the court. 
3. The Division Director and the Commission signed an Order on November 3, 1993, 
adopting the recommended findings and conclusions of the ALJ, but not adopting the 
recommended order. Instead of probation as recommended, the Director and Commission 
ordered suspension of Petitioner's license 
5. On December 3, 1993, the Director and Commission modified the November 3, 
1993, Order by adding a fuller explanation as to why they did not adopt the ALPs recommended 
order of probation. 
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6. The November 3, 1993, Order was signed by the Director and the Commission, 
but was not mailed to Petitioner. Nor, evidently was it made public. The December 3, 1993, 
Order was both signed by the Director and the Commission and mailed to Petitioner. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Utah Code Section 61-2-11 states: 
The commission, with the concurrence of the director [of the Division of Real 
Estate], may . . . suspend [a license if the licensee] is found guilty of: 
(1) making any substantial misrepresentation; 
* * * 
(12) conviction of a criminal offense involving moral turpitude; 
This section clearly supports the Commission's and the Director's Order suspending 
Petitioner's license.. Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the AUTs findings of fact indicate that Petitioner had 
been convicted of mail fraud, a crime involving moral turpitude. Paragraph 6 of the ALTs 
findings of fact states that Petitioner's negative response to the application question whether he 
had been "convicted of a criminal offense in the past two years" was not reasonable, and that 
consequently, Petitioner had intentionally misrepresented the facts of his conviction on his 
application. These findings and the law clearly uphold the suspension of Petitioner's license. In 
that respect, the Order was within the Commission's authority and supported by law, and 
therefore, not arbitrary and capricious. 
In addition, this Subsection indicates that the Commission and the Director have the 
discretion to impose the sanction for cause shown. The Commission and the Director were not 
obligated to adopt the findings and conclusions of the ALJ, nor were they compelled to adopt his 
recommended order or the reasoning upon which it was based. I find that the Commission and 
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the Director articulated reasonable grounds, supported by the record, for rejecting the 
recommended order. 
Since the Commission and the Director are granted discretion to suspend Petitioner's 
license in this case, an analysis of their Order must determine whether they abused that discretion. 
An abuse of discretion would result if the sanction imposed were found to be beyond the scope of 
the statute or to be inconsistent with the prior decisions of the Commission and the Director. As 
stated, the sanction — suspension — is allowable under the law. Therefore, the main inquiry is 
whether the sanction is unreasonable or inconsistent with the Commission's prior practices. 
Review of the December 3, 1993, Order and the cases comparing Petitioner's punishment 
indicates that the Order is not inconsistent with other prior recent cases. 
2. With respect to the issue of whether the Commission and the Division can, should, 
or must base its order on whether or not Petitioner has served probation is not relevant to this 
case. Petitioner's license was suspended because of the recent felony conviction and because of 
misrepresentation. However, I do note that Division Rule R162-2.2.7 does state that whether 
restitution and probation have been completed is a factor which may be considered. That rule 
applies to "applicants"; whether that term includes more than first-time applicants is not clear. 
Although the point may not be relevant here, it perhaps should be clarified by the Division and 
Commission. In this case, Petitioner's suspension is to last until he completes probation. That is a 
reasonable use of the discretion which the Commission and the Division have in placing licensees 
on probation or suspension. 
3. Petitioner suggests that the Commission was improperly influenced by Division 
staff regarding the form of the December 3, 1993, Order, resulting in a denial of due process. I 
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find that there is no appearance of a due process violation in this case The only variation 
between the November Order and the December Order was the articulation of the factual basis for 
the sanction imposed and the comparison of prior cases Both Orders suspended Petitioner's 
license Both Orders adopted the facts and conclusion determined by the ALJ The December 
version articulated the reasoning of the Commission beyond the November Order Had there 
been a different result in the December Order, the inference of improper communication might be 
considered, but that is not the case. Also, Petitioner has no support or proof of the allegation. 
ORDER 
Consistent with the preceding analysis, the Commission's Order of December 3, 1993, 
suspending Petitioner's license, is upheld in its entirety. Effective immediately, Petitioner's license 
is suspended for the duration of his probation with the federal court. 
Dated this 25th day of March 1994 
Constance B White, Executive Director 
Department of Commerce 
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL 
Judicial review of this Order may be obtained by filing a Petition for Review with the 
Court of Appeals within 30 days after the issuance of this Order on Review. Any Petition for 
Review must comply with the requirements of Sections 63-46b-14 and 63-46b-16, Utah Code 
Annotated 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on the 25th day of March 1994,1 caused to be mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Order on Review, properly addressed, postage prepaid, to: 
Larry G. Reed 
Bret A. Gardner 
Crowther & Reed 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
455 South 300 East, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Robert E. Steed 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Division 
111 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
and caused a copy to be hand-delivered to: 
Steven Stewart, Director 
Division of Real Estate 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
\ 
c ^ r < 
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ADDENDUM V 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Application of : FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 
Rodney G. Goodman to Renew his : LAW AND RECOMMENDED ORDER 
Real Estate Sales Agent License : Case No. RE92-03-19 
Appearances: 
Robert Steed for the Division of Real Estate 
Bster Stirba for the Applicant 
By the Administrative Law Judge: 
Pursuant to notice duly served by regular mail, a hearing was conducted in the above-
entitled matter on September 11, 1992 before J. Steven Eklund, Administrative Law Judge for 
the Department of Commerce. Thereafter, evidence was offered and received. 
The Administrative Law Judge, being fully advised in the premises, now submits the 
following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order for review by the 
Real Estate Commission and the Director of the Division of Real Estate: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The applicant was initially licensed to practice as a real estate sales agent in the 
State of Utah sometime in 1982. The applicant was thereafter sporadically engaged in a real 
estate practice, his license subsequently lapsed, he later reapplied for a similar license -and 
was again so licensed in 1990. The applicant was actively engaged in the practice of real 
estate during the next 18-24 months. In May 1990, he successfully completed the 
examination for licensure as a principal broker and thereafter applied for such a license. 
2. On August 3, 1990, the applicant pled guilty to one count of securities fraud in 
Third District Court proceedings. He was placed on probation for 36 months and ordered to 
pay a $2,500 fine and restitution totalling $3,362. On August 8, 1990, the Commission and 
Division conducted a hearing as to the applicant's request for licensure as a principal broker. 
The application was denied based on the just-described conviction. 
3. On January 30, 1992, the applicant sought renewal of his sales agent license. The 
application was not processed because he did not submit proof he had completed mandatory 
continuing education requirements and had further indicated he had been convicted of a 
criminal offense in the last two years. The applicant was contacted by Division staff, at 
which time he disclosed his guilty plea to a securities fraud conviction in another case. 
Specifically, the applicant pled guilty to one count of securities fraud in United States District 
Court proceedings. Said judgment was entered January 31, 1992. The applicant was 
sentenced to serve a three (3) year prison term, the Court suspended any execution of that 
sentence and placed the applicant on probation for three (3) years, ordered him to pay a 
$5,000 fine and also complete 150 hours of community service. 
4. The applicant's convictions for securities fraud were prompted by separate 
instances of unlawful conduct which occurred sometime between 1985 and 1987. The 
applicant provided information and fully cooperated with both state and federal authorities as 
to other securities matters under investigation. He has paid both the fine and restitution 
entered in the state court proceeding and his probation was terminated in August 1992. The 
applicant has made timely payments—to date—toward the fine which was imposed by reason 
of his conviction in the federal court proceeding. He has also completed 75 hours of the 
community service required incident to the sentence imposed in that proceeding. 
5. There is no evidence the applicant has been engaged in other fraudulent conduct 
He was not acting as a real estate sales agent when he engaged in the conduct which led to 
his criminal convictions. There is also no evidence he has been involved in other criminal 
activity or has acted in any unprofessional manner relative to conduct undertaken as a real 
estate sales agent subsequent to being licensed in that capacity. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Utah Code Ann., Section 61-2-11(12) provides the Commission, with the concurrence of 
the Division Director, may deny reissuance of any license if the licensee, whether acting as an 
agent or on his own account, is convicted of a criminal offense involving moral turpitude. 
The applicant acknowledges his convictions reflect serious instances of unlawful conduct 
However, he urges certain mitigating factors exist and requests his application for renewal of 
a sales agent license be granted, possibly subject to certain restrictions. 
The term "moral turpitude" has often been defined as "inherent baseness or depravity in 
the private social relations or duties by man to man or by man to society". Pearl v. Florida 
Board of Real Estate, Fla. App, 394 So.2d 189, 191 (1981). Whether criminal conduct 
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involves moral turpitude depends on the inherent nature of the crime itself rather than 
circumstances surrounding the particular transgression. Okabe v. Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, 617 F.2d 863 (1982). Generally, all crimes of which fraud is an 
element are considered to involve moral turpitude. Moretti v. State Board of Pharmacy, 2 Pa. 
Cmwlth. 121, 277 A.2d 516, 518 (1971); Iowa State Bar Ass'n v. Kraschel, 148 N.W.2d 621, 
627 (1967). In Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951), the United States Supreme Court 
stated as follows: 
Whatever else the phrase "crime involving moral turpitude" may mean in 
peripheral cases, the decided cases make it plain that crimes in which fraud was an 
ingredient have always been regarding as involving moral turpitude . . ." Fraud is 
the touchtone by which this case should be judged. The phrase "crime involving 
moral turpitude" has without exception been construed to embrace fraudulent 
conduct. Id at 232. 
Certain courts have applied the following test: 
Conviction of some crimes establishes moral turpitude on its face. These 
include crimes that necessarily involve an intent to defraud or intentional 
dishonesty for the purpose of personal gain 
In re Fahey, 106 CaLRptr. 313, 505 R2d 1369, 1373 (1973); Howard v. Nicholls, 111 Ariz. 
383, 621 P.2d 292, 297 (1980); In re Strict 238 Cal Rptr. 397, 738 P.2d 743, 749 (1987); In 
re Kelley, 276 CaLRptr. 375, 801 P.2d 1126, 1130 (1990). Courts have stated convictions 
involving forgery, extortion, bribery, robbery, embezzlement and other forms of theft clearly 
involve moral turpitude. In re Rothrock, 16 Cal.2d 449, 106 P.2d 907 (1940). Morasch v. 
Immigration and Naturalization Service, 363 F.2d 30, 31 (1966). 
The nature of the applicant's convictions clearly reflect he committed crimes involving 
moral turpitude. Thus, a sufficient basis exists to possibly deny the applicant's request to 
renew his sales agent license. Statutes similar to Section 61-2-11(12) have been enacted to 
protect the public from unscrupulous and dishonest real estate licensees and the purpose of 
such statutes is to guard against fraudulent real estate practices. Pearl v. Florida Board of 
Real Estate, supra, at 192. Those who deal with real estate sales agents have an unquestioned 
right to expect such licensed individuals will consistently act with integrity and in a 
completely honest and ethical manner. 
The applicant's prior misconduct was inexcusable and raises a substantial question as to 
his personal integrity. He engaged in such unlawful conduct as motivated by his desire for 
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personal gain. Significantly, the state court conviction reflects financial injury occurred due 
to the applicant's misconduct Nevertheless, various mitigating factors suggest it would be 
appropriate to renew the applicant's sales agent license, subject to certain rigorous 
probationary terms. Neither of the applicant's convictions were occasioned by conduct he 
undertook as a licensed real estate sales agent Commendably, he has diligentiy satisfied all 
probationary terms with respect to the state court conviction and his probation in that respect 
has been terminated. This Court is further impressed with the applicant's testimony and 
demeanor during the instant hearing, which reveals he candidly acknowledges his prior 
indiscretions, recognizes the seriousness of his past misconduct and states he will 
scrupulously avoid any recurrence of such inappropriate behavior. 
The applicant has only maintained an active practice as a real estate sales agent for a 
relatively brief time. However, the Court duly notes there is no evidence he has engaged in 
any unprofessional conduct while acting in any capacity as a sales agent and he has not been 
the subject of any complaints relative to the manner in which he has provided services to 
others in his practice as a sales agent The Court concludes the following Recommended 
Order will allow the Commission and the Division to appropriately monitor the applicant's 
practice as a sales agent as to adequately protect the public. The Court cautions the applicant 
that any failure to comply with the terms governing his licensure or any subsequent 
misconduct reflecting a failure to act with complete honesty and integrity as a sales agent will 
likely prompt further proceedings and certainly jeopardize his ability to maintain any 
continued licensure as a sales agent in this state. 
RECOMMENDED ORDER 
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED the applicant's request to renew his license as a real 
estate sales agent in the State of Utah be granted. Such license shall be issued, subject to the 
following probationary terms and conditions: 
(1) Prior to any renewal of the applicant's license, he shall 
duly provide the Division with adequate documentation he 
has completed all mandatory continuing education 
requirements. 
(2) The applicant's license to practice as a real estate sales agent shall 
remain on probation, concurrent with the duration of his existing 
probation with respect to his federal securities fraud conviction. 
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(3) Ilie applicant shall meet with the Commission eu-iy sis >) 
months for the duration of the probationary term set forth hci "n. 
Prior to each meeting, a written report, shall be provided i-> : i ^ 
Commission from the applicant's probation officer as to whedier he 
has maintained full compliance with the terms of his criminal 
probation. At such time the applicant's criminal probation ma\ \H: 
terminated, the Commission shall determine whether the probation as 
* * """ applicant's licensure as a sales agent should also be terminated. 
MI> principal, broker with whom the applicant may subsequently 
become affiliated as a. sales agent shall provide written reports to the 
Commission every six (6) months, said reports to be submitted 
concurrent with the applicant's regularly scheduled meetings with the 
Commission. The reports shall summarize the general nature of the 
applicant's practice as a sales agent and whether his performance in 
that capacity has been satisfactory. The applicant's principal broker 
shall disclose to the Commission any concerns as to the applicant's 
conduct as a sales agent 
Should the appl icant .fail to comply with the above stated, terms and condidoi is 0.1: 
otherwise violate any statute or rule which governs his lu ense • * practice a-^  a sales aj t. 
further proceedings shall be con.du.cted and a determination made whether his license si •u.J 
be suspended, or revoked 
Dated this of October, 1992. 
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BEFORE THE REAL ESTATE COMMISSION 
OF THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
In the Matter of the Application of ORDER 
Rodney Goodman to Renew his 
Real Estate Sales Agent License CASE NO. RE92-03-19 
The foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated 
October 6, 1992 are approved and adopted. The Recommended Order of 
the Administrative Law Judge is adopted, with the exception that 
paragraph (3) of the recommended order will read as follows: 
"(3) The applicant shall provide a written report to the 
Commission every six months from his probation officer as to 
whether he has maintained full compliance with the terms of 
his criminal probation. At such time as the applicant's 
criminal probation may be terminated, the Commission shall 
determine whether the probation as to the applicant's 
licensure as a sales agent should also be terminated." 
DATED this (*H^ day of Ocdhjkw , 1992. 
UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION 
PAUL NEUENSCHWANDER 
BETTiTOLBERT ' 
H i 
ROBERT H 7TFGT.EK 
The abovQ Order is confirmed and approved V-v t he undersigned 
/ ^ ^ ' . --1.V/ • f 0e//cJ0,~ , 1^2. 
6LAINE E. "TWITCHELL, 
f^EyuJ^ii 
DIRECTOR 
DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE 
92-03-19.o 
ADDFMXM VI 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF REAL ESI ATE 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
O F TOE S T A T E 0 F U T A H 
In the Matter of the License of : riMMNGS i)1; I i ;, M INCLUSIONS OF 
James HL Hutchinson to Act : L A u \x-l> RI < >MMENDED ORDER 
as a Real Estate Sales Agent : Case No. RE-91-03-04 
Appearances: 
David W. Lund for the Division of Real Estate 
Jerome EL Mooney for Respondent 
By the Administrative I .aw J udge: 
IE ursuant to notice duly served by iq;»iikii: mail, a lieaiuig was condui . ..e above-
entitled matter on June 13, lO'H before J, Steven Eklund,- Administrative Law Judge for the 
Department of Commerce. Ilicreafter, evidence was offered and received. 
The Administrative Law Judge, being folly advised in the premises, now submits the 
following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order for review by the 
Real Estate Commission and the Executive Director of the Department of Commerce: 
FINDINGS OF FAC I ' 
1. ku>pundci.: * „ i'-. -. ^iii/s relevant t'Wiv,* . , uuip M,I ,-n incused to 
practice as a bale* agon • * :. * 1 *ah. Respondent becaim M> HOMISIV n " Vcember 
1989 and ha^ been affiliated \Mtti three different principal biokei., v nice Ou.-bei J990, 
Respondent has been affiliated with a Dan R Kannelh P^ ing h-* licensure .is a sales apent. 
Respondent has experience in the sale of residential properties, typically those which involve 
HUD and VA financing. Respondent has engaged in approximately 25 such transactions 
since he obtained his license as a sales agent 
2. Respondent has applied for a -ic^n.v oi a j.:-nopal bi .: ,. « jai 
proceeding wa:. init.a--J
 ruii>ii...., .v. itix: i^uoiix ^ . M .« • r - ; ,/:„M\ 
dated ,*• ' • ' ' • - ^ — ; informed kr <n; u,u, an> „ ;,.,n <.n !a;> appkea* » 
a principal broker's license would be held in abeyance pending the outcome of this 
proceeding. 
3. On May 18, 1990, Respondent met a Jerome Gatto and was informed by Mr. 
Gatto he was seeking financing to purchase a private club. Respondent subsequently 
introduced Mr. Gatto to a Steve Peterson as to assist Mr. Gatto in his attempts to obtain a 
loan. Sparing detail, Respondent and his wife, Mr. Peterson and his wife and a Paul 
Matthews (who is a loan officer for Wasatch Bank) and his wife subsequently met in a social 
setting at a private club. During the course of that evening, Respondent related to Mr. 
Matthews that he (Respondent) had been informed Mr. Matthews would receive monies to 
facilitate a loan for Mr. Gatto. Based on the undisputed and credible evidence presented 
during the instant hearing, Respondent was likely intoxicated to some extent when that 
conversation occurred. There is no evidence that Respondent would realize any financial 
benefit from any transaction involving a loan to Mr. Gatto. 
4. Criminal proceedings were subsequently initiated in the United States District 
Court for the District of Utah, whereby Respondent was charged with having made a corrupt 
offer to a bank officer, a violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 215(a)(1). The criminal indictment in 
that regard set forth the allegation that Respondent offered "money and services" if Mr. 
Matthews "would cause the Wasatch Bank to make a loan" to Mr. Gatto. Respondent pled 
guilty to the just-stated charge. On February 1, 1991, Respondent was sentenced on that 
conviction. Specifically, the Court entered the following judgment: 
The defendant is placed in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons 
at the Community Treatment Center for a period of FOUR MONTHS 
with TWENTY-FOUR (24) hour supervision. After confinement, the 
defendant is placed on THREE (3) YEARS supervised release with 
special conditions . . . . The defendant must report to the Community 
Treatment Center by 12:00 noon on or before February 4, 1991. A 
fine of ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($1,000) is imposed. 
The Court further ordered as follows: 
(1) The defendant must abide by all standard conditions of 
supervised release and shall not violate any federal, state or local law. 
(2) The defendant must engage in alcohol therapy as directed by the 
United States Probation Office. (3) The defendant must submit to 
random urinalysis as requested by the United States Probation Office. 
(4) The defendant shall not associate in any way with Jerome Gatto-
2 
f ;•: i he defendant must pay the fine imposed prior to the end of 
supervised release pursuant to a schedule by the IJ. S. Probation 
Office. 
On February 1^, \l)9\, Respnr..iem was o*mmiu<\i t»> tlv ("Vnunu /i1- IV-aun.';u ' Vnt*-. !:e 
was subsequent!1, discharged < ;. Juiv ^ I •"•. I-Vspoiiwjut participated in an alcohol abu.v 
treatment progiam Jurm;1 the ii:^ t stated v:v.> While •; ^  -crimed. Respondent .satisfactorily 
completed that program. 
""he hearing in the instant proceeding was conducted ten (10) days after 
Respondent's release from, the Community Treatment Center. The terms of Respondent's 
criminal probation require that he meet with a probation officer between, the first and fifth, of 
each month. As of the date of the hearing in this proceeding, Respondent ha-.' met once wi?h 
his probation officer. This record does not reflect the nature lre*p IK , \„- no. .: ,..-.* 
outpatient alcoholic treatment which Respondent ..— », ^ " ->n- - w : - '••••', * w,w a^ .'> - ot 
subject to any urinalysis prior to the hearing in this matter 
6 Respondent was not acting as a. real, estate sales agent when he engaged in the 
conduct which led to his criminal conviction There is no evidence Respondent has been 
involved in other criminal,, activity or he has acted in any unprofessional, manner .relative to 
conduct undertaken as a real estate sales agent subsequent to being licensed in that capacity. 
CONCLUSIONS OF I AW 
Section 61-2-11(! 1' Utah Code Ann \\-*^* - amended, pr .•;dc\. .ru. . . i \ . . penalty 
not to exceed $500 nuv
 t , - *> icai esuu license^ - *- . -laced » - obationary 
status, suspend * ' • i^ -* *d *! "ir licensee, whether acting a^  an a *nt or o;\ in,, own 
account, Is convicted of a criminal offense involving moral, turpitude. Respondent contends 
he has not engaged in. conduct violative of 'the just-referenced statute, Given the nature of his 
conduct and certain mitigating factors, Respondent alternatively urges 'that no basis exists to 
revoke or suspend his license as a real estate agent 
The terra "moral, turpitude"1 has often 'been defined as "inherent baseness or depravity in 
the private social relations or duties owed by man to man or bj man to society" Pearl v. 
condu- : t i nvolves moral turpitude depends on the inherent nature of the crime iteclf rather than 
the circumstances surrounding the particular transgression. Okabe v. Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, 61.7 F.2d 863 (1982) Generally, all crimes of which, fraud, is an 
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element are considered to involve moral turpitude. Moretti v. State Board of Pharmacy, 2 Pa. 
Cmwlth. 121, 277 A.2d 516, 518 (1971); Iowa St. Bar Ass'n. v. Kraschel, 148 N.W. 2d 621, 
627 (1967). In Jordan v. De George. 341 U.S. 223 (1951), the United States Supreme Court 
stated as follows: 
Whatever else the phrase "crime involving moral turpitude" may mean in 
peripheral cases, the decided cases make it plain that crimes in which fraud was an 
ingredient have always been regarded as involving moral turpitude. . . . Fraud is 
the touchstone by which this case should be judged. The phrase "crime involving 
moral turpitude" has without exception been construed to embrace fraudulent 
conduct. Id. at 232. 
Various courts have recognized that any crime of bribery involves moral turpitude. United 
States v. Esperdy, 285 F.2d 341, 342 (2d Cir. 1961); Okabe v. Immigration and Naturalization 
Service, supra. See comments in People v. Brandon, 218 Cal. Rptr. 909 (1986). 
Respondent has engaged in serious criminal conduct While his conviction was not 
occasioned by conduct he undertook as a licensed sales agent, the nature of the conviction 
reflects that Respondent committed a crime involving moral turpitude. Thus, a proper basis 
exists to enter a disciplinary sanction with regard to Respondent license as a sales agent. It 
has been stated that statutes similar to Section 61-2-11(12) have been enacted to protect the 
public from unscrupulous and dishonest real estate licensees and that the purpose of such 
statutes is to guard against fraudulent real estate practices. Pearl v. Florida Board of Real 
Estate, supra, at 192. 
Significantly, Respondent's criminal conduct was not undertaken in furtherance of a real 
estate transaction involving his participation as a licensee. Other mitigating factors also 
compel the conclusion that Respondent's license should neither be revoked nor suspended. 
There is no evidence Respondent obtained any financial benefit as a result of his criminal 
conduct or that his status as a licensee facilitated the criminal conduct which occurred. 
Rather, it appears that Respondent's misconduct occurred in a social setting and he had 
introduced individuals previously known to either himself or his wife for the furtherance of a 
financial transaction unrelated to his status as a licensee. Further, Respondent's criminal 
conduct may have been preceded by an excessive consumption of alcohol. 
The Court notes that Respondent was to commence an alcohol therapy program and 
would be subject to random urinalysis, pursuant to the terms and conditions of his criminal 
probation. This record does not reflect the nature of any rehabilitative treatment Respondent 
4 
•ia.-> <M;uincd ..KK." i;. . L\i>,r ::^m ;ia* { <;M;:V
 ;._. 1 rratmi'm < -.t -. - . -. in1, 
urinalysis vK*"1, *^;r. !*
 ;->v K-M: .'miiiucicii Ih'.'.ev^r. the* •'•iiii: .utiaih assumes that 
Respondent nas vigilantly complied vwth the terms i>I his prohaUt.n .subsequent to his release 
from the Community Treatment Center. 
Based on the just-stated .assumption, and with due regard for the above-described 
circumstances, an appropriate sanction should enter to monitor Respondent's continued 
compliance with the requirements of his criminal probation and to reduce the possibility that 
Respondent might subsequently engage in fraudulent miscondiu' w < h . . ' a • .irdi.v ,e 
public health, safct *-*h - -fc m his capa,.;i\ t> a h. m v J ^K a^err. 
<FCOM\lFNP! :P ORDER 
WHEREFORE, 11 ..- - • DuRLD that Respondent's license to practice as a real estate 
sales agent in the State of Utah shall be placed on probation, subject to the following terms 
and conditions: 
(1) Respondent's .licensure as a sales agent shall remain on probation 
concurrent with the duration of his criminal probation, subject to the 
same terms and conditions which govern his criminal probation. 
(2) Respondent shall meet with the Real Estate Commission at the next 
regularly scheduled Commission meeting after this Recommended 
Order may be adopted by the Commission and the Executive Director 
of the Department of Commerce. At Respondent's initial meeting 
with the Commission, he shall provide documentation which reflects 
the nature and frequency of his participation in an alcohol therapy 
program subsequent to June 13, 1991, the date of the hearing in this 
proceeding. Respondent shall also provide a written report from his 
probation officer which reflects whether Respondent has complied 
with the terms of his criminal probation, whether any urinalysis has 
been conducted and the results of such testing. 
(3) If Respondent has satisfied the terms of 'his criminal probation to date 
and he has regularly and continuously participated in an alcohol 
therapy program, Respondent may continue to practice as a real estate 
sales agent, subject to the terms and conditions set forth herein. 
/A) Respondent shall meet with the Commission every six months. Prior 
to each meeting, a written report shall be provided to the Commission 
from Respondent's probation officer as to whether Respondent has 
continued to comply with the terms of his criminal probation. If 
Respondent's supervised criminal probation is terminated prior to the 
expiration of three years from, the commencement of that probation, 
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the Commission shall then determine whether to concurrently 
terminate Respondent's probation regarding his licensure as a sales 
agent 
Should Respondent fail to comply with the terms and conditions set forth above, or 
otherwise violate any statute or rule which governs his license to practice as a sales agent in 
this state, further proceedings shall be conducted and a determination made whether a 
sanction of greater severity than that set forth herein is warranted. 
Dated this of November, 1991. 
f 3teven nistrative Law Judge 
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BEFORE THE DIVISION OF REAL EST/uE 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the License of 
James H. Hutchinson to Act 
as a Real Estate Sales Agent 
ORDER 
Case No. RE-91-03-04 
The foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order are 
hereby confirmed and adopted. 
Dated this 2o+i^ day of November, 199L 
UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION: 
William H. Coleman 
* ^ / ^ 
Paul Neuenschwander 
Beth.Tolbert 
mi&ft'Vfo^ 
Dan C Simons, Jr. 
audia E. Ashby ft Cl i  
The above Order is hereby confirmed and approved by the undersigned this 2otiw day 
of November, 1991. 
Blaine E. Twitchell 
Director, Division of Real Estate 
Department of Commerce 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the License of 
James H. Hutchinson to Act 
as a Real Estate Sales Agent 
ORDER 
Case No. RE-91-03-04 
Pursuant to a November 20, 1991 Order, the Utah Real Estate Commission confirmed and 
adopted the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order entered in the 
above-entitled proceeding. Upon review of the foregoing, notice is hereby given that the just-
stated order is confirmed and approved by the undersigned this ^7 day of November, 
1991. 
David L. Buhler, Executive Director 
Department of Commerce 
ADDENDUM VII 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Certification of : 
Gary O'Brien to Act as a : FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 
Real Estate Instructor and to Operate a : LAW AND RECOMMENDED ORDER 
Real Estate School and the License of : Case No. RE90-11-23 
Gary O'Brien to Act as a : 
Real Estate Broker : 
Appearances: 
David W. Lund for the Division of Real Estate 
Gary O'Brien for Respondent 
By the Administrative Law Judge: 
Pursuant to notice duly served by regular mail, a hearing was conducted in the above-
entitled matter on September 6, 1991 before J. Steven Eklund, Administrative Law Judge for 
the Department of Commerce. Thereafter, evidence was offered and received. 
The Administrative Law Judge, being fully advised in the premises, now submits the 
following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order for review by the 
Real Estate Commission and the Director of the Division of Real Estate: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Respondent is, and at all times relevant to these proceedings has been, licensed to 
practice as a principal broker in the State of Utah. Respondent became so licensed 
approximately 5-8 years ago. Respondent has operated a real estate school since February 
1979 and has been certified as a real estate instructor for approximately fourteen (14) years. 
Respondent is only minimally active as a principal broker, most of his time being committed 
to teaching and operating his real estate school. Respondent also periodically hires 
independent contractors to teach at the school, which provides instruction for approximately 
thirty (30) students per month. 
2. In early January 1990, Respondent decided to start a real estate school in Las 
Vegas, Nevada. In order to obtain necessary financing for that business, Respondent and a 
Peter Judd (also known as Alan K. Judd) entered a written agreement on January 11, 1990, 
whereby Mr. Judd would loan Respondent $10,000. Respondent agreed to repay Mr. Judd 
$1,000 per month, commencing March 1, 1990, for a period of twelve (12) months. 
Respondent and Mr. Judd further agreed the former would pledge a boat as collateral for the 
loan, Mr. Judd would be a second lien holder as to that boat and would hold title to that 
property until such time as the loan had been repaid. Respondent and Mr. Judd also agreed 
that the latter would receive 10% of net profits generated by the real estate school so long as 
that school existed. 
3. Shortly after Respondent entered into the January 11, 1990 contract with Mr. 
Judd, he became aware he did not possess any title to the boat In fact, no such evidence of 
ownership was routinely issued for such personal property at that time. Since Mr. Judd had 
requested that Respondent provide him with a title to the boat, Respondent prepared what 
purported to be such a title. Specifically, Respondent used a certificate of title with regard to 
an automobile he owned and he created what appeared to be a title which reflected Mr. 
Judd's status as a second lien holder on the boat Respondent provided that document to Mr. 
Judd when he (Respondent) received the $10,000 loan a few days after the contract had been 
executed. 
4. Respondent subsequently made payments totalling $2,000 to Mr. Judd toward the 
partial satisfaction of the loan. However, it appears the Nevada real estate school did not 
generate the income Respondent had anticipated would be available to repay the loan. Mr. 
Judd subsequently became aware of the counterfeit title Respondent had provided to him. 
Approximately November 1990, Mr. Judd initiated a civil action against Respondent and also 
filed a complaint with the Division and the Utah Department of Motor Vehicles. 
5. Third Circuit Court criminal proceedings were initiated on or about December 6, 
1990, whereby Respondent was charged with the crime of False Evidence of Title and 
Registration, a second degree felony. The criminal information in that regard set forth the 
allegation that Respondent had: 
(a) Altered with fraudulent intent, any certificate of title, registration 
card, registration plate or permit issued by the department. 
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(b) Forged or counterfeited any such document or plate purporting to 
have been issued by the department. 
(c) Altered or falsified, with fraudulent intent, or forge any assignment 
upon a certificate of title. 
(d) Held or used any such document or plate knowing the same to have 
been altered, forged or falsified. 
Respondent initially entered a not guilty plea as to the just-described charge. On May 20, 
1991, Respondent withdrew that plea and then pled guilty to the offense of attempted forgery, 
a Class A misdemeanor. Respondent was sentenced to a twelve (12) month term in the Salt 
Lake County Jail, ordered to pay a $500 fine and surcharge and was also ordered to pay 
restitution, the amount of which was to be determined by the Adult Probation and Parole 
Division. A stay of enforcement was entered as to the just-described jail sentence and 
Respondent was placed on probation for eighteen (18) months. In lieu of the fine and a $125 
surcharge, Respondent was ordered to complete 100 hours of community service by 
November 1, 1991. 
6- As of September 6, 1991, the date of hearing in the instant proceeding, 
Respondent had completed twenty-five (25) hours of community service. Respondent 
anticipated he would complete the remaining community service by November 1, 1991 and 
his criminal probation could be terminated at that time. No amount of restitution has been 
established and it appears possible no such restitution will be required. The litigation 
between Mr. Judd and Respondent, which includes a countersuit by the latter, is still pending. 
7. Respondent was not acting as a real estate principal broker, a real estate instructor 
or the operator of a real estate school in this state when he engaged in the conduct which 
prompted his criminal conviction. There is no evidence Respondent has been involved in 
other criminal activity or that he has acted in any unprofessional manner relative to conduct 
undertaken in any of those capacities subsequent to being licensed or certified in that regard. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Section 61-2-11(12), Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, provides that a civil penalty 
not to exceed $500 may be imposed or a real estate license may be placed on probationary 
status, suspended or revoked if the licensee, whether acting as an agent or on his own 
account, is convicted of a criminal offense involving moral turpitude. Respondent contends 
he has not engaged in conduct violative of the just-referenced statute and he asserts that the 
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meaning of moral turpitude is vague, unclear and no statutes or rules define that term. 
Respondent further asserts no basis exists to enter any disciplinary sanction as to his 
certification as a real estate instructor or his status as the operator of a real estate school. 
Given the nature of his conduct and certain mitigating factors, Respondent also urges that his 
license as a real estate principal broker should not be revoked or suspended and entry of any 
such sanction would be excessive, in light of action taken by the Division in other cases 
involving a violation of Section 61-2-11(12). 
Various courts have recognized that the "elusive concept" of moral turpitude has long 
been the subject of judicial scrutiny. Rice v. Alcoholic Bev. Control Appeals Board, 89 Cal. 
App.3d 30, 152 CaLRptr. 285, 288 (1979); Henry H. v. Board of Pension Commissioners, 149 
Cal.App.3d 965, 197 CaLRptr. 636, 641 (1983). Courts have "grappled with the amorphous 
term in a variety of factual contexts largely involving disciplinary proceedings" and have 
conceded that the concept of moral turpitude "by nature defies any attempt at a uniform and 
precise definition". Rice v. Alcoholic Bev. Control Appeals Board, supra, at 288-89, and 
cases cited therein. However, it has also been held that the lack of a precise statutory 
definition for the term "moral turpitude" does not render such a provision unenforceable, 
Henry H v. Board of Pension Commissioners, supra. 
Moral turpitude has often been generally defined as innerent baseness or depravity in 
the private social relations or duties owed by man to man or by man to society". Pearl v. 
Florida Board of Real Estate, Fla. App. 394 So.2d 189, 191 (1981). Whether criminal 
conduct involves moral turpitude initially depends on the inherent nature of the crime itself 
rather than the circumstances surrounding the particular transgression. Okabe v. Immigration 
and Naturalization Service, 617 F.2d 863 (1982). Thus, certain courts have applied the 
following test: 
Conviction of some crimes establishes moral turpitude on its face. These 
include crimes that necessarily involve an intent to defraud or intentional 
dishonesty for the purpose of personal gain . . . . They may also include particular 
crimes that are extremely repugnant to accepted moral standards such as murder . . 
or serious sexual offenses . . . . There are other crimes the commission of which 
may or may not involve moral turpitude; conviction of these is not ground for 
discipline without additional proof of circumstances surrounding the offense. 
In re Fahey, 106 CaLRptr. 313, 505 P.2d 1369, 1373 (1973). In re Strick, 238 CaLRptr. 397, 
738 P.2d 743, 749 (1987); In re Kelley, 276 CaLRptr. 375, 801 P.2d 1126, 1130 (1990). 
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Generally, all crimes of which fraud is an element are considered to involve moral 
turpitude. Moretti v. State Board of Pharmacy, 2 Pa. Cm with. 121, 277 A.2d 516, 518 
(1971); Iowa St. Bar Ass'n v. Kraschel, 148 N.W.2d 621, 627 (1967). In those cases, "moral 
turpitude" has thus been found when a fraudulent or dishonest intent exists, particularly when 
undertaken for the purpose of personal gain. Howard v. Nicholls, 127 Ariz. 383, 621 P.2d 
292, 297 (1980); In re Fahey, supra. In Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951), the 
United States Supreme Court stated as follows: 
Whatever else the phrase "crime involving moral turpitude" may mean in 
peripheral cases, the decided cases make it plain that crimes in which fraud was an 
ingredient have always been regarded as involving moral turpitude . . . . Fraud is 
the touchstone by which this case should be judged. The phrase "crime involving 
moral turpitude" has without exception been construed to embrace fraudulent 
conduct Id. at 232. 
Courts have stated that convictions involving forgery, extortion, bribery, robbery, 
embezzlement and other forms of theft clearly involve moral turpitude. In re Rothrock, 16 
Cal.2d 449, 106 P.2d 907 (1940). Morasch v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 363 
F.2d 30, 31 (1966). 
Respondent's conviction was not occasioned by conduct he undertook as a licensed 
principal broker or certified real estate instructor. Importantly, his conviction bears no 
relation whatever to the manner in which he has operated his real estate school. Nevertheless, 
the nature of his conviction reflects that Respondent committed a crime involving moral 
turpitude. Thus, a sufficient basis exists to enter a disciplinary sanction as to Respondent's 
license as a principal broker and a certified real estate instructor. Statutes similar to Section 
61-2-11(12) have been enacted to protect the public from unscrupulous and dishonest real 
estate licensees and the purpose of such statutes is to guard against fraudulent real estate 
practices. Pearl v. Florida Board of Real Estate, supra, at 192. 
Significantly, Respondent's criminal conduct was not undertaken in furtherance of a real 
estate transaction involving his participation as a principal broker or his status as a certified 
Utah real estate instructor. While Respondent's misconduct did also not involve the operation 
of his Utah real estate school, the transaction between Mr. Judd and Respondent was not 
entirely unrelated to the latter's status as a licensee. Further, Respondent realized a 
substantial financial benefit as a result of his criminal misconduct Simply put, it appears 
likely that Mr. Judd loaned the monies in question to Respondent based—in part—on Mr. 
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Judd's reliance he would hold title to the personal property which was collateral for that loan. 
Certain mitigating factors exist in this case. There is no evidence Respondent has previously 
engaged in any criminal conduct or that his license as a principal broker or certification as a 
real estate instructor has been otherwise subject to disciplinary sanction in the state. 
Disciplinary action has been taken in two other cases after a licensee was convicted of a 
criminal offense involving moral turpitude. Pursuant to a stipulation (In re Ostler, Case No. 
RE89-06-10), an associate broker's license was suspended for one (1) year and thereafter 
placed on probation for two (2) years, based on the conviction of possession of a forged 
writing, a Class A misdemeanor. Significantly, Mr. Ostler had engaged in such criminal 
conduct within the context of a real estate transaction. While Respondent has also been 
convicted of a misdemeanor and his conduct involved a forged document, Respondent's 
conviction was not related to conduct undertaken in a real estate transaction. 
More recently, a real estate sales agent's license was placed on probation, as prompted 
by the licensee's conviction of having made a corrupt offer to a bank officer ( In re 
Hutchinson, Case No. RE91-03-04). Similar to Mr. Hutchinson, Respondent's criminal 
misconduct did not directly involve his status as a licensee and he did not utilize his licensure 
to further his criminal activity. Unlike Mr. Hutchinson, this record reflects that Respondent 
realized a significant personal gain from his criminal misdeed. It is arguable whether a short 
term suspension of Respondent's license as a real estate principal broker and certification as a 
real estate instructor may be warranted. However, the recommended order set forth below is 
predicated on the fact that no direct nexus exists between Respondent's criminal conduct and 
his existing licensure and certification through the Division. Further, there is no reason to 
conclude Respondent will likely engage in similar criminal misconduct in the future or that 
his ability to properly operate a real estate school in this state and provide instruction has 
be^n seriously compromised by reason of his existing conviction. 
RECOMMENDED ORDER 
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Respondent's license to practice as a real estate 
principal broker in the State of Utah and his certification as a real estate instructor be placed 
on probation, subject to the following terms and conditions: 
(1) Respondent's licensure as a principal broker and his certification as a 
real estate instructor shall remain on probation concurrent with the 
duration of his criminal probation, subject to the terms and conditions 
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which govern his criminal probation. 
(2) Respondent shall meet with the Real Estate Commission at the next 
regularly scheduled Commission meeting after this Recommended 
Order may be adopted by the Commission and the Director of the 
Division of Real Estate. At that meeting with the Commission, 
Respondent shall provide documentation which reflects the current 
status of his criminal probation and whether he has complied with all 
the terms of that probation. 
(3) If Respondent has satisfied the terms of his criminal probation to 
date, Respondent may continue to practice as a real estate principal 
broker and certified real estate instructor. 
(4) During the duration of Respondent's criminal probation, Respondent 
shall submit a written report to the Division every six (6) months 
from his probation officer as to whether he has continued to comply 
with the terms of his criminal probation. Based on the Commission's 
review of any given report, Respondent shall thereafter meet with the 
Commission as may be warranted. At such time that Respondent's 
criminal probation may be terminated, the Commission shall 
determine whether to concurrently terminate Respondent's probation 
regarding his licensure as a principal broker and certification as a real 
estate instructor. 
Should Respondent fail to comply with the terms and conditions set forth above, or 
otherwise violate any statute or rule which governs his license to practice as a principal 
broker or his certification as a real estate instructor in this state, further proceedings shall be 
conducted and a determination made whether a sanction of greater severity than that set forth 
herein is warranted. 
It is further ordered that no disciplinary sanction shall enter as to Respondent's 
continued ability to operate a real estate school in this state. 
Dated this V " * d a y of December, 1991. 
J.(§teven Ekhpnd 
Administrative Law Judge 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Certification of 
Gary O'Brien to Act as a 
Real Estate Instructor and to Operate a 
Real Estate School and the License of 
Gary O'Brien to Act as a 
Real Estate Principal Broker 
ORDER 
Case No. RE90-11-23 
By the Commission and Division Director 
Pursuant to notice duly served, a supplemental hearing was conducted in the above-entitled 
matter on January 15, 1992 before J. Steven Eklund, Administrative Law Judge for the 
Department of Commerce, the Utah Real Estate Commission and Blaine E. Twitchell, 
Director of the Division of Real Estate. 
Thereafter, evidence was offered and received. The Commission and the Division 
Director, now being fully advised in the premises, hereby adopt the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law previously submitted in this matter and further enter the following: 
SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Respondent completed 100 hours of community service by November 1, 1991. No 
restitution will be required of Respondent with regard to his criminal probation. On 
November 12, 1991, Respondent's probationary supervision in that regard was terminated. 
He is no longer required to report to Adult Probation and Parole authorities. 
2. Litigation initiated against Respondent by Mr. Judd has been dismissed. Respondent 
may subsequently seek dismissal of his countersuit regarding Mr. Judd. 
ORDER 
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Respondent's license to practice as a real estate 
principal broker in the State of Utah and his certification as a real estate instructor be placed 
on probation for one (1) year from the date of the termination of his criminal probation. 
Thus, the probationary term with respect to Respondent's license and certification shall 
continue until November 12, 1992. 
Should Respondent violate any statute or rule which governs his practice as a principal 
broker or his certification as a real estate instructor in this state, further proceedings shall be 
conducted and a determination made whether a sanction of greater severity than set forth 
herein is warranted. 
It is further ordered that no disciplinary sanction shall enter as to Respondent's continued 
ability to operate a real estate school in this state. 
Dated this / 7^ day of January, 1992. 
Blaine E. Twitchell, Director 
Division of Real Estate 
ADDENDUM VIII 
DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
BLAINE E. TWITCHELL, DIRECTOR 
160 EAST 3 00 SOUTH 
P.O. BOX 45806 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84145-0806 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE REAL ESTATE COMMISSION 
In the Matter of the License STIPULATION & ORDER 
of JAY WILSON to Act as 
a Real Estate Sales Agent CASE NO. RE91-04-13 
The Real Estate Division of the Department of Commerce of the 
State of Utah (the Division), by and through its Director, Blaine 
E. Twitchell, and Jay Wilson (Wilson), a licensed real estate sales 
agent hereby stipulate and agree as follows: 
STIPULATION 
1, Wilson is and has been a licensee of the Division at all 
times relevant to this case, holding License No. SA 34449. 
2, A complaint in the matter has been brought and properly 
filed pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated Section 61-
2-1, et sec., (1953, as amended). 
3, Wilson admits the jurisdiction of the Utah Real Estate 
Commission (the Commission) over him and over the subject matter of 
this action. 
4, Wilson specifically waives the right to confront adverse 
witnesses and the right to a formal hearing pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated Section 61-2-1, et seq., (1953, as amended), and the 
rules and regulations promulgated thereunder. 
5, The Division and Wilson recognize and agree that this 
Stipulation alone shall not be binding upon the Commission. If the 
Commission does not concur in the disciplinary action proposed 
herein, this Stipulation shall be of no further force or effect and 
a formal hearing shall be scheduled for this matter. 
6. Wilson acknowledges that upon approval by the Commission, 
this Stipulation shall be made a part of the attached find Order, 
and shall be the final compromise and settlement of this matter. 
7• Wilson acknowledges that he enters into this Stipulation 
voluntarily, and that no promise or threat whatsoever has been made 
by the Division, or any member, officer, agent or representative of 
the Division to induce him to enter into this Stipulation, 
8. On July 30, 1990 Wilson entered a plea of guilty to Mail 
Fraud, 18 U.S.C. Section 1341, and to Conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. Section 
371 in U.S. District Court for the District of Utah in Case 90-CR-
005W. 
9. Wilson admits that the above conviction constitutes a 
violation of Utah Code Annotated Section 61-2-11(12): "...(12) 
Conviction of a criminal offense involving moral turpitude." 
10. Respondent acknowledges that he has been informed of his 
right to be represented by legal counsel, and that he has been 
represented by Attorney Thomas V. Rasmussen in this matter. 
11. The Division and Wilson propose that Wilson's Utah real 
estate license be revoked but that the revocation will be stayed 
upon the following conditions: 
a, Wilson abides by the restitution schedule established by 
the court and makes full restitution; 
b. Wilson's real estate license is placed on probation for 
a term concurrent with his criminal probation; and 
c. Wilson commits no violations of the real estate licensing 
law involving dishonesty, fraud, or misrepresentation during the 
period of probation. If such violations are proven by the Division 
after notice and hearing, the stay will be lifted and the 
revocation imposed. 
12. This Stipulation constitutes the entire agreement between 
the parties herein and supersedes and cancels any and all prior 
negotiations, representations, understandings, or agreements 
between the parties. There are no verbal agreements which modify, 
interpret, construe, or affect this agreement. 
DATED this / / ^  day of ^y/Jj/lUL/c«^ 1993. 
BLAINE E. fWITCHELL, DIRECTOR 
DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
STATE OF UTAH 
T 
DATED this day of , 1993 
jp- WILSON 
DATED this \ ^ day of t-e^
 ro<ru , 1993. 
THOMAS V. RASMUSSEN 
ATTORNEY FOR JAY WILSON 
ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing stipulation and for good cause 
appearing therefore: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Jay Wilson's Utah real estate 
license is revoked effective immediately, but that the revocation 
shall be stayed upon the following conditions: 
a. Wilson shall abide by the restitution schedule 
established by the court and make full restitution; 
b. Wilson's real estate license shall be placed on probation 
for a term concurrent with his criminal probation; and 
c. Wilson shall commit no violations of the real estate 
licensing law involving dishonesty, fraud, or misrepresentation 
during the period of probation. If such violations are proven by 
the Division after notice and hearing, the stay shall be lifted and 
the revocation imposed. 
DATED this 2Sr^ day of ^bfTOu^^^y , 1993. \KXXj!Ksi^-i/ 
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